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Abstract. This paper establishes the first theorem relating resilience, round complexity and authen-
tication in distributed computing. We give an exact measure of the time complexity of consensus
algorithms that tolerate Byzantine failures and arbitrary long periods of asynchrony as in the Internet.
The measure expresses the ability of processes to reach a consensus decision in a minimal number of
rounds of information exchange, as a function of (a) the ability to use authentication and (b) the num-
ber of actual process failures, in those rounds, as well as of (c) the total number of failures tolerated and
(d) the system configuration. The measure holds for a framework where the different roles of processes
are distinguished such that we can directly derive a meaningful bound on the time complexity of im-
plementing robust general services in practical distributed systems. To prove our theorem, we establish
certain lower bounds and we give algorithms that match these bounds. The algorithms are all variants
of the same generic asynchronous Byzantine consensus algorithm, which is interesting in its own right.
1 Introduction
1.1 Context
We establish a theorem on the complexity of the consensus problem in a general distributed system
framework composed of three kinds of processes [21]: proposers, acceptors and learners (Fig. 1).
Basically, the problem consists for the learners to decide on a common value among those proposed
by the proposers, using acceptors as witnesses that help ensure the agreement. Every learner is
supposed to eventually learn a value (liveness) that is the same proposed value for all learners
(safety) [2]. Measuring the complexity of learning a decision in this framework automatically derives
a measure of the complexity of state machine replication, a general technique to build robust
distributed services [19,31].
We study consensus algorithms that tolerate Byzantine failures. A Byzantine failure can either
correspond to a crash or a malicious behavior (by default, a failure means a Byzantine failure). A
process is malicious if it deviates from the algorithm assigned to it in a way that is different from
simply stopping all activities (crashing). Besides process failures, the algorithms we consider also
tolerate arbitrarily long periods of asynchrony, during which the relative speeds of processes and
communication delays are unbounded. Such algorithms are sometimes called asynchronous [6, 21].
We assume however that the duration of the asynchronous periods and their number of occurrences
are both finite, otherwise consensus is known to be impossible [14]. Processes that do not fail
are called correct processes, and they can eventually communicate among each other in a timely
manner. The model assumed here, called the eventually synchronous model [12], matches practical
systems like the Internet which are often synchronous and sometimes asynchronous. Whereas it is
important to tolerate periods of asynchrony and the largest number of faults possible, it is also
important to optimize algorithms for favorable, and most frequent, situations where the system is
synchronous and very few processes fail.
Clearly, it is never possible to learn a decision in one round of information exchange (we say
communication round) and yet ensure agreement despite possible Byzantine failures. There are
however algorithms [6] where, in certain favorable situations, a decision is learned after three com-
munication rounds by all correct learners: we talk about fast learning. In fact, as conjectured in [21],
and as we show in this paper, there are even slightly more favorable situations, which are still very
plausible in practice, under which learning can be achieved in two communication rounds: we talk
in this case about very fast learning and a proposer from which a value can be learned very fast
is called a privileged proposer. The theorem we establish in this paper determines the exact condi-
tions under which very fast (resp. fast) learning can be achieved. Underlying the theorem lies the
notion of favorable (resp. very favorable) runs that precisely captures the favorable situations we
mentioned above. Namely, a run r of a consensus algorithm A is said to be very favorable (resp.
favorable) if: (1) r is synchronous, (2) a single (correct) privileged proposer pl proposes a value in
r and (3) at most Q ≤ F (resp. more than Q but at most F ) acceptors are faulty (here, F is one of
the resilience thresholds define below). Basically, very fast (resp. fast) learning is achieved in very
favorable (resp. favorable) runs of algorithm A.
Our theorem is general in that it is parameterized by (1) different resilience thresholds, (2)
different system configurations, as well as (3) the ability of processes to use authentication primitives
(public-key cryptography) [30] to achieve fast (resp. very fast) learning.
1. We distinguish two resilience thresholds:M and F ;M denotes the maximum number of acceptor
malicious failures despite which consensus safety is ensured (the number of acceptor crash-only
failures does not influence safety); F denotes the maximum number of acceptor failures despite
which consensus liveness is ensured. Particularly interesting is the case whereM > F : consensus
safety should be preserved despiteM acceptor malicious failures, but liveness is guaranteed only
if the number of acceptor failures is at most F .
2. We distinguish two system configurations: C1 and C2; C1 is the configuration where at least
one privileged proposer might not be an acceptor, or there are at least two privileged proposers
(Fig. 1(a)); C2 is the configuration where there is only one privileged proposer, which is also
one of the acceptors (Fig. 1(b)).
3. Finally, we also distinguish the case where the processes are allowed to use authentication to
achieve very fast (resp. fast) learning from the case where they are not. Note that, in both cases,
we do not prevent processes from using authentication in runs that do not enable very fast or
fast learning, typically non-favorable runs with proposer failures and asynchronous periods.
Roughly, authentication allows the recipient of the message to validly claim to a third party
that it received the message from the actual original sender of the message [30]. This ability is a
major source of overhead [24,27] and hence, we would typically like to avoid using authentication
for (very) fast learning.
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1.2 Theorem
The theorem states that there is a consensus algorithm that:
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1. Achieves very fast learning in configuration C1 despite the failure of Q acceptors if and only if
the total number of acceptors in the system (Na) is such that Na > 2M +F +2Q. In addition,
the same algorithm achieves fast learning despite the failure of F acceptors,
– with authentication, given the same total number of acceptors, Na.
– without authentication, if and only if Na is also greater than 2F +M +min(M,Q).
2. Achieves very fast learning in configuration C2 with (resp. without) authentication despite the
failure of Q acceptors if and only if Na > 2(M − 1)+F +2Q (resp. Na > max(2(M − 1)+F +
2Q, 2M + F +Q)). In addition, the same algorithm achieves fast learning despite the failure of
F acceptors,
– with authentication, given the same total number of acceptors, Na.
– without authentication, if and only if Na is also greater than 2F +(M −1)+min(M −1, Q).
To help understand some of the parameters of the theorem, let us illustrate them through some
specific interesting cases and focus on configuration C1 where authentication does not impact the
ability to achieve very fast learning.
1. F =M . Here we consider consensus algorithms that are correct when at most F =M acceptors
fail. At one extreme, very fast (resp. fast) learning is possible without authentication when
(Q = 0) no acceptor fails (resp. F acceptors fail) if and only if Na > 3F ; i.e., less than one-third
of the total number of acceptors can fail. At the other extreme, very fast learning is possible
without authentication when the maximum possible number of acceptors fail (Q = F ) if and
only if Na > 5F ; i.e., less than one-fifth of the total number of acceptors can fail. In the second
case, very fast learning is possible whenever fast learning is also possible.
2. F = 3 and M = 1. Here we consider consensus algorithms that are correct when at most F = 3
acceptors fail, out of which at most M = 1 acceptors are malicious. For such algorithms, when
for example Q = 1 acceptor fails, very fast learning is possible only if Na ≥ 2M+F+2Q+1 = 8.
However, with Na = 8 acceptors, fast learning is only possible with authentication. To achieve
fast learning without authentication, Na ≥ 2F +M+min(M,Q)+1 = 9 acceptors are required.
3. F = 2, M = 3. Here we consider consensus algorithms that are correct when at most F = 2
acceptors fail and possibly only safe when at most M = 3 acceptors are malicious (i.e., these
algorithms are correct when there are at most 2 failures, and they are safe but may not be live
when there are 3 malicious failures). For such algorithms, when for example Q = 1 acceptor
fails, very fast learning is possible only if Na ≥ 2M +F +2Q = 11. At the same time, the same
number of acceptors allows fast learning without authentication (because Na is greater than
2F +M +min(M,Q) = 8).
In short, the theorem expresses, in a general and precise way, a fundamental trade-off between
the resilience and complexity of asynchronous Byzantine consensus. Two sides of complexity are
considered: the communication complexity (sometimes called latency), which depicts the number of
rounds of information exchange before a decision is learned, as well as the authentication complexity,
considered a major overhead factor in Byzantine computing [24,27].
1.3 Proof Overview
The necessary parts of our theorem consist of a set of lower bounds. We prove these bounds using
indistinguishability arguments that simultaneously exploit the asynchrony of the network and the
Byzantine failures of the processes, in order to contradict the ability to achieve very fast (resp.
fast) learning. For example, to show that very fast learning is impossible given a certain number
of failures, we first construct two very favorable runs where some learner l learns two distinct
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values very fast (i.e., in two communication rounds). Second, we exhibit two asynchronous runs
with Byzantine failures that are respectively indistinguishable at l from the two very favorable
synchronous runs, and hence l learns distinct values in the two asynchronous runs. Third, we
make use of asynchrony and Byzantine failures in a way that the two asynchronous runs are
indistinguishable to any learner distinct from l. This helps us build an eventually synchronous
run in which Agreement is violated. Assuming that the processes can use authentication in effect
restrict the range of the possible Byzantine behavior that we can exploit in the proof.
The sufficiency parts of our theorem are shown by exhibiting algorithms that match the cor-
responding lower bounds. Interestingly, these algorithms can all be viewed as variants from the
same generic algorithm, which we call “Distributed consensus a` Grande Vitesse” (DGV). DGV is
parameterized by F , M (and Q) as well as by the underlying configuration considered (C1 vs. C2).
The algorithm constitutes an appealing building block to implement robust yet efficient distributed
services on the Internet. DGV allows learning in two communication rounds (i.e., very fast learning)
in very favorable runs, and, at the same time, gracefully degrades to allow learning in three commu-
nication rounds (i.e., fast learning) when the conditions are slightly less desirable, i.e., in favorable
runs. Roughly, in DGV, if some decision value v was learned at time t, it is guaranteed that no
proposer can impose a value other than v after time t. To achieve this, the value that acceptors
can indeed accept is carefully selected on the basis of the acceptors estimates of the decision value
up to that point of the execution, not to miss a value that may have been learned. In certain cases,
potential disputes on which value should be accepted may arise, but these are solved by detecting
the existence of the malicious acceptors that cause these disputes. DGV is composed of two parts:
(1) a Locking module and (2) an Election module. In short, the Locking module ensures consensus
safety whereas the Election module ensures consensus liveness under eventual synchrony assump-
tion. The key element of DGV is its choose() function, within the Locking module, that determines
which value should be accepted by an acceptor at a given point of execution. Variants of DGV are
mainly obtained by varying implementations of this function.
1.4 Roadmap
In Section 2 we discuss related work. In Section 3 we recall the consensus problem and we define
the model we consider in this paper. In Section 4 we show the necessary part of our theorem, by
establishing and proving certain lower bounds, for both configurations (C1, followed by C2). In
Section 5 we give the algorithms that match these lower bounds, as variants of our generic DGV
algorithm.
2 Related Work
In the following, we first recall the historical context of asynchronous Byzantine consensus and its
solvability bounds. Then we mention previous complexity. Finally, we compare our algorithm with
related ones.
Byzantine consensus was introduced by Pease, Shostak and Lamport [26] in a synchronous
model of distributed computation, where they established that two-third of correct processes is
necessary and sufficient to solve the problem if processes do not use authentication. The same
bound was extended in [4] to the asynchronous case, even if processes can use authentication. In
the general framework of [21], which we consider in this paper, this translates into Na > 3F and
M = F . In that framework, and for the more general case where M 6= F , it is not very difficult to
extend the proof of [4] and show that Na > 2F +M is a necessary and sufficient condition to solve
asynchronous Byzantine consensus [21].
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In [8,13], it was shown that any synchronous Byzantine consensus algorithm needs t+1 rounds
of information exchange (communication rounds) to reach consensus, where t is the number of
failures tolerated. The bound is given considering the case where all processes must simultaneously
reach a decision. If the decision does not need to be reached simultaneously, then early decision is
possible andmin(f+2, t+1) rounds are needed for deciding [9,17] in runs where f ≤ t processes are
faulty. The model with asynchronous periods, called the eventually synchronous model, was first
introduced by Dwork, Lynch and Stockmeyer in [12] (with language abuse, and as we mentioned in
the introduction, algorithms in this model have been called asynchronous [6,21]). For asynchronous
algorithms with crash failures, it was established that f +2 rounds are needed to achieve consensus
in synchronous runs with f failures [11]. All these complexity bounds were established in a restricted
framework where all processes play the same role.
In [21], Lamport motivated the study of consensus complexity bounds in a general framework
with distinct proposers, acceptors and learners, for the ability of this framework to better match
the practical use of consensus within state machine replication protocols [19,31]. He conjectured a
fundamental tight bound on the maximum resilience to achieve very fast learning in asynchronous
Byzantine consensus. Recently, and concurrently with this paper, Lamport proved his conjecture for
non-Byzantine failures in [22]. Our theorem generalizes that conjecture, which we thus prove for the
Byzantine case as well. Our generalization goes in two directions. First, we consider the possibility
of fast learning, besides very fast learning, and this can be viewed as a nice graceful degradation
flavor for runs that are not favorable enough to allow very fast learning, but are still favorable
enough to allow fast learning. Second, we also consider the impact of using authentication [30].
By doing so, we highlight the fact that Lamport’s conjecture [21] holds only if very fast learning
with authentication is precluded. In many systems, the use of authentication is far more expensive
than several rounds of communication [24,27]. It is thus of primary importance to state the precise
impact of authentication on the number of communication rounds needed to achieve consensus.
Certain Byzantine consensus algorithms are synchronous (e.g., [28]), or assume that a subset
of the system is synchronous [7]. The first asynchronous Byzantine consensus algorithm was given
by Castro and Liskov in [6]. The algorithm, called Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT),
considered the special case where M = F and Na = 3F + 1. In PBFT, fast learning is achieved in
synchronous runs with up to F =M malicious acceptors and assuming a correct leader (i.e., what
we call favorable runs in this paper). Very fast learning, which is possible in their case for Q = 0
was not considered. Our DGV algorithm enables very fast learning if the leader is correct, the run
is synchronous and up to Q acceptors fail (called very favorable runs in this paper). However, if Q′
acceptors fail, where Q < Q′ ≤ F , DGV degrades gracefully and features the same complexity as
PBFT (i.e., fast learning).
A deconstruction of the Paxos algorithm, similar to the decomposition of DGV we give in
this paper, was given in [3] for the non-Byzantine case. Our decomposition makes it possible to
have a reusable Locking module (capturing consensus safety properties), that can be combined
with different Election algorithms (providing consensus liveness), in the same vein as [10]. For
instance, our Election module can easily be shifted to the level of proposers or implemented by
a deterministic scheduler. In comparison, in PBFT, the techniques used for ensuring safety were
incorporated into the liveness providing part (the leader change algorithm). By introducing a pair
of additional messages in certain (non-favorable) runs of DGV which, by the way, do not critically
degrade the performance of the algorithm in these runs, we make the safety providing part of the
algorithm (i.e., Locking module) independent from the liveness providing part of the algorithm
(i.e., Election module). In practical implementations, one might of course consider removing these
messages.
A few asynchronous Byzantine consensus algorithms enabling very fast learning have been
recently proposed. Namely, these are Kursawe’s optimistic Byzantine Agreement [18], Martin and
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Alvisi’s FaB Paxos (Fast Byzantine Paxos) [25], the oracle-based protocol by Friedman, Mostefaoui
and Raynal [15], and Lamport’s algorithm [23]. Kursawe’s algorithm considers the specific case of
M = F and Na = 3F + 1, and enables very fast learning when Q = 0. It does not allow fast
learning if some acceptor actually fails (which is feasible in this case). Developed concurrently with
this paper, Martin and Alvisi’s FaB Paxos algorithm is simple and elegant: it considers configuration
C1 and the case whereM = F = Q (therefore assuming Na = 5F+1 acceptors), while enabling very
fast learning despite F failures. This algorithm does not match the lower bound in configuration
C2, nor does it adapt to the general case where M 6= F 6= Q, in configuration C1. The oracle-based
randomized protocol by Friedman et al. considers the case whereM = F and Q = 0 in configuration
C1, and achieves very fast learning with Na = 5F + 1 acceptors (more than required by our lower
bound). Lamport’s algorithm achieves very fast learning in configuration C1.
To summarize, while certain algorithms, for some special values of Q, for the special case where
M = F and in configuration C1 were suggested in the literature, our DGV algorithm is the first
generic one with respect to M , F and Q, that delivers optimal performance. Furthermore, even
for the special case where M = F , we are not aware of any solution that handles the case where
Q 6= 0 in configuration C2. In addition, no algorithm combines very fast learning and fast learning:
achieving both properties is not trivial, especially when handling the general values of M , F and
Q and precluding authentication.
3 Preliminaries
In this paper we address the consensus problem, as defined in [21], in a distributed system composed
of three sets of processes: (1) proposers = {p1, p2, ..., pNp}, (2) acceptors = {a1, a2, ..., aNa}, and
(3) learners = {l1, l2, ..., lNl} [20,21]. In this problem, every proposer starts with a proposal value.
Proposers may never propose a value, or may propose several times. Learners need to learn the same
proposal value. Acceptors act as witnesses to help learners agree. On proposing a value, a proposer
communicates with acceptors, and learners learn a value on receiving appropriate messages from
the acceptors. More precisely, in every run of a consensus algorithm, only proposers propose values
and learners learn values, such that the following properties hold:
– (Validity:) If a learner learns a value v, then some proposer proposes v1;
– (Agreement:) No two learners learn different values;
– (Termination:) If a correct proposer proposes a value, then eventually, every correct learner
learns a value.
Processes may fail by arbitrarily deviating from the algorithm assigned to them. When a process
fails by crashing, i.e., simply stop its execution, we say that it has crashed, and if it deviates from
the algorithm in a way different from crashing, we say that it is malicious. We consider consensus
algorithms that provide safety properties, i.e., Validity and Agreement, despite at mostM malicious
acceptors. Safety properties of consensus are preserved regardless of the number of acceptor that
crashed, as long as the number of malicious acceptors is at mostM . However, we consider consenus
algorithms that provide liveness, i.e., Termination, only if the total number of acceptor failures is
at most F . In the case where M ≥ F , Validity and Agreement have to be preserved in all runs in
which at most M acceptors fail. However, Termination might be violated and it is guaranteed only
if the number of actual acceptor failures is at most F . Finally, any number of learners might fail
by crashing. As in [21], we assume that learners are not malicious.
1 Here we adopt language abuse for presentation simplicity. In fact, it is impossible to ensure that a malicious
proposer, on proposing a value, will not pretend that it has proposed a different value. A more precise definition
of Validity would be: if a learner l learns a value v in run r, then there is a run r′ (possibly different from r) such
that some proposer proposes v in r′, and l cannot distinguish r from r′.
6
Every pair of processes is connected by a bi-directional channel that may duplicate, delay or
lose messages, or may deliver them out of order. However, channels do not alter messages. We
assume that every message m that is sent is unique and has a m.sender field that is supposed to
contain a unique identifier of the sending process. We assume a computationally bounded adversary
as well as standard cryptographic techniques in the design of Byzantine consensus algorithms [6].
We consider public-key cryptography [30] (PKC), message authentication codes [32] and message
digests [29], where D(m) denotes a digest of the message m and 〈m〉σp denotes m, accompanied
by D(m) digitally signed by process p. It is commonly admitted that PKC is usually considered
pretty expensive [24,27]. As a consequence, and as pointed out in the introduction, we distinguish
the case where processes can always use PKC (we say use authentication), including in favorable
(or very favorable) runs to achieve fast (or very fast) learning, from the case where the processes
can only use authentication when fast (or very fast) learning is not possible.
To circumvent the impossibility of fault-tolerant consensus in an asynchronous system [14], we
make the following eventual synchrony assumptions [12]: in any run, there is a bound ∆c and a
time GST (Global Stabilization Time), such that any message sent by a correct process to a correct
process at time t′ ≥ GST is received by time t′ + ∆c. ∆c and GST do not need to be known by
the processes. We also assume an upper bound ∆auth on the local computation related to PKC.
We assume all other local computations to require negligible time.
Assume that every process starts consensus with some estimate of ∆c and ∆auth (the bounds on
message transmission delay and local computations). We say that a run of the consensus algorithm
is synchronous if: (1) all correct processes have the same estimates of ∆c and ∆auth, say δc and
δauth, respectively, (2) δc ≥ ∆c and δauth ≥ ∆auth, and (3) GST = 0. Roughly speaking, in a
synchronous run, no correct process times out waiting for messages from another correct process.
4 Lower Bounds
To precisely state the lower bounds underlying our theorem, we assume full information protocols
in a round-by-round eventually synchronous model [16]. In each round, the processes send messages
to all processes, receive messages in that round, update their states and move to the next round,
such that the following properties hold. Denote by alive(k) the set of processes that complete round
k. There is a round k such that for every round k′ ≥ k, every message sent by a correct process in
alive(k′) to another correct process in alive(k′) is delivered in round k′. A synchronous run is then
simply a run in which k = 1. In our lower bounds, we assume that there are always at least two
proposers and at least two learners.
First we prove the lower bounds for configuration C1. Recall that the system is in configuration
C1 if: (a) there is a single privileged proposer that is not an acceptor (configuration C1a), or (b)
there is more than one privileged proposer (regardless of whether they are also acceptors or not
- configuration C1b). Then we will consider configuration C2, where there is a single privileged
proposer, that is also an acceptor.
4.1 Configuration C1
Consider the case with a single privileged proposer that is not an acceptor (configuration C1a).
Proposition L.1. Let A be any algorithm and pl the only privileged proposer, which is furthermore
not an acceptor. If in every very favorable run of A every correct learner learns a value by round 2
despite the failure of Q acceptors, then Na > 2Q+ F + 2M .
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Proof L.1. Suppose by contradiction that Na ≤ 2Q + F + 2M . We divide the set of acceptors
into five sets, Q1, Q2, F1, M1 and M2, where the first two sets are of size at most Q, the third
set is of size at most F , and the last two sets are of size at most M , respectively. Without loss of
generality we assume that each of these five set consists of only one process. If a set has more than
one process, we simply modify the runs so that all processes inside a set receive the same set of
messages, and if they fail, they fail at the same time, in the same way; the proof also holds if any of
the bounds Q, F or M is 0. Assume there are two learners l1 and l2, and there are two proposers:
the privileged proposer pl, and proposer px.
Suppose pl is correct and proposes a value at the beginning of round 1. If a proposal value
is learned in round 2, then the only possible communication pattern is the following (remember
that on proposing a value, the proposer communicate with acceptors, and learners learn a message
on receiving appropriate messages from the acceptors): (Round 1) proposer pl sends messages to
all acceptors; (Round 2) every acceptor forwards the message received in the first round to every
process. Learners on receiving a sufficient number of messages from acceptors learn a value.
We only consider the cases where pl proposes 0 or 1 at the beginning or round 1 (as this is
sufficient to prove the lower bound). Let m1 and m0 be the authenticated messages, sent by pl in
round 1, when pl is correct and proposes 1 or 0, respectively. We say that an acceptor ai plays 1
(resp. 0) to some acceptor or learner qj in round k of some run r, if qj cannot distinguish at round
k, the run r from some run in which (1) ai has received m1 (resp. m0) from pl in the first round,
and (2) ai is correct. It is important to note that, due to the cryptographic assumptions we make,
ai can play 1 (or 0) only if ai has received m1 (resp. m0) from pl. (If pl is faulty then pl may send
m1 to ai even if pl proposed 0, and thus, ai may play 1.)
A very favorable partial run is a prefix of a very favorable run. From our assumption, in every
very favorable run, the correct learners learn the proposal value (of pl) by round 2. Consider the
following two very favorable partial runs, R1 and R2 (The message patterns of the first rounds of
these runs are illustrated in Figure 2).
R1: All processes except l1 and Q1 are correct. Proposer pl proposes 1 in round 1, Q1 crashes
before sending any message in round 2, and learner l1 receives round 2 messages from all acceptors
except Q1. From our assumption on A, l1 learns 1 at the end of round 2, and then, l1 crashes before
sending any message in round 3.
R2: All processes except l1 and Q2 are correct. Proposer pl proposes 0 in round 1, Q2 crashes
before sending any message in round 2, and learner l1 receives round 2 messages from all acceptors
except Q2. From our assumption on A, l1 learns 0 at the end of round 2, and then, l1 crashes before
sending any message in round 3.
We now construct three runs that are not very favorable.
R3: All processes are correct except (1) the proposer pl, which is malicious, (2) acceptor F1, which
crashes before sending any message in round 2, and (3) l1 which crashes before sending any message
in round 3. In round 1, proposer pl sends m0 to the acceptors Q1 and M1, and m1 to the rest of
the acceptors. Acceptor F1 crashes such that no process receives round 2 message from F1, and l1
crashes such that no process receives any round 3 message from l1. From round 2, acceptors Q1
and M1 play 0 to all processes, and Q2 and M2 play 1 to all processes. In round 3, correct proposer
px proposes 0. Since a correct proposer proposes, eventually correct learner l2 learns some value
v ∈ {0, 1}, say at round K.
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R4: All processes are correct except (1) the proposer pl and the acceptor M1, which are malicious,
and (2) learner l1 which crashes before sending any message in round 3. In round 1, proposer pl
sends m0 to acceptor Q1, both m1 and m0 to M1, and m1 to the rest of the acceptors. In round
2 and higher rounds, acceptor Q1 plays 0 to all processes, acceptors Q2, F1 and M2 play 1 to all
processes. However, malicious acceptor M1 plays 1 to learner l1 and plays 0 to all other processes.
(M1 can do so because it has received both m1 and m0.) Learner l1 receives round 2 message from
all acceptors except Q1. Clearly, at the end of round 2, l1 cannot distinguish R4 from R1 (because
it receives the same set of messages from the acceptors in round 2 of both runs), and hence, learns
1. Then learner l1 crashes before sending any message in round 3. In round 3, correct proposer px
proposes 0. Up to round K, all non-crashed (i.e., processes that are correct or malicious) processes
receive messages from all other non-crashed processes distinct from F1 (i.e., all messages sent by F1
are lost up to round K). At the end of round K, no correct process distinct from F1 can distinguish
R4 from R3 (because every non-crashed acceptor different from F1 plays identical values in both
runs), and hence, learner l2 learns v ∈ {0, 1} at roundK. All non-crashed processes receive messages
from all other non-crashed processes (including F1) in rounds higher than K.
R5: All processes are correct except (1) the proposer pl and the acceptor M2, which are malicious,
and (2) learner l1 which crashes before sending any message in round 3. In round 1, proposer pl
sends m1 to acceptor Q2, both m1 and m0 to M2, and m0 to the rest of the acceptors. In round
2 and higher rounds, acceptor Q2 plays 1 to all processes, acceptors Q1, F1 and M1 play 0 to all
processes. However, malicious acceptor M2 plays 0 to learner l1 and plays 1 to all other processes.
(M2 can do so because it has received both m1 and m0.) Learner l1 receives round 2 message
from all acceptors except Q2. Clearly, at the end of round 2, l1 cannot distinguish R5 from R2
(because it receives the same set of messages from the acceptors in round 2 of both runs), and
hence, learns 0. Then learner l1 crashes before sending any message in round 3. In round 3, correct
proposer px proposes 0. Up to round K, all non-crashed processes receive messages from all other
non-crashed processes distinct from F1 (i.e., all messages sent by F1 are lost up to round K.) At
the end of round K, no correct process distinct from F1 can distinguish R5 from R3 (because every
non-crashed acceptor different from F1 plays identical values in both runs), and hence, learner l2
learns v ∈ {0, 1} at round K. All non-crashed processes receive messages from all other non-crashed
processes (including F1) in rounds higher than K.
Clearly, either R4 or R5 violates consensus Agreement : l2 decides v in both runs, but l1 decides 1
in R4 and 0 in R5. However, in both runs, at most M acceptors are faulty: a contradiction with
the requirement that A does not violate Validity and Agreement if M processes are faulty. 2
Remarks (L.1). In round 3 of R3, the proposal by px is required to ensure that l2 decides in R3.
If px does not propose then the only (possible) proposal in the run is by the malicious proposer
pl, and hence, the Termination property does not require any learner to decide. Secondly, for ease
of presentation we state in the proof that pl sends two messages (m1 and m0) to M1 in round 1
of R4. In fact, pl may sends a single message such that M1 can recover both m1 and m0 from it.
Since both pl and M1 are malicious in R4, they collude to achieve this. (A similar argument holds
for messages from pl to M2 in round 1 of R5.)
Now we sketch the proof of the same bound in the case of configuration C1b, i.e. where there
are two (or more) privileged proposers (that do not necessarily have to be malicious). The proof is
very similar to proof L.1. We will refer to this proof as to proof L.2.
Proposition L.2. Let A be any algorithm, and pv and pw two privileged proposers. If, in every
very favorable run of A, in which a single privileged proposer proposes, every correct learner learns
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a value by round 2, then Na > 2Q + F + 2M . (To strengthen this proposition, we assume that
privileged proposers may fail only by crashing.)
Proof L.2 (sketch). The proof of this part of the theorem is a trivial modification of proof L.1,
obtained as follows. Each run in proof L.1 (R1 to R5) is modified to get five new runs (R1’ to
R5’). To get run Ri’ from Ri (1 ≤ i ≤ 5), in round 1, we remove the propose by proposer pl and
add propose(1) by pv and propose(0) by pw, and we define m1′ to be the message sent by pv (on
proposing 1) and m0′ to be the message sent by pw (on proposing 0). In round 1 of Ri’, an acceptors
receives m1′ if it receives m1 in Ri (and similarly for m0′). (Thus M1 receives messages from both
pv and pw in round 1 of R4.) Acceptors play 1 on receiving m1′ and play 0 on receiving m0′. The
rest of the proof remains the same.2 2
Now we prove the rest of part 1 of the theorem. This establishes the bound on the number
of acceptors required for achieving fast learning without authentication combined with very fast
learning (with or without authentication) in configuration C1a (the proof can be migrated to con-
figuration C1b in the similar way proof L.2 is derived from proof L.1). We refer to this proof as
proof L.3. Clearly, any algorithm that achieves fast learning without authentication combined with
very fast learning has a restricted authentication pattern:
1. The messages sent from the privileged proposer to acceptors in round 1, and the messages sent
from the acceptors to the learners in round 2, may or may not be authenticated, and
2. The messages exchanged among acceptors in round 2, and the messages sent from acceptors to
the learners in round 3, are not authenticated.
In this proof we use indistinguishability arguments, that exploit the fact that a malicious process
can claim that it received a different value from a correct process than the one the correct process
actually sent. This is possible, as we assume that the messages that are used for fast, but not for
very fast learning, are not authenticated. In addition, we exploit the asynchrony of the network
and the fact that malicious processes can cooperate.
Proposition L.3. Let A be any algorithm and pl the only privileged proposer, which is a further-
more an acceptor, such that, in every very favorable (resp. favorable) run of A every correct learner
learns a value by round 2 (resp. 3). In addition, suppose A satisfies the restricted authentication
pattern. Then, Na > 2F +M +min(M,Q).
Proof L.3. First, we consider the case where M ≥ Q. Suppose, by contradiction, that Na ≤
2F +M + Q. We divide the set of acceptors into five sets, F1, F2, MQ1, Q1 and Q2, where the
first two sets are of size at most F , the third set is of size at most M − Q, and the last two sets
are of size at most Q. Without loss of generality, we assume that each of these five sets consists of
only one process. (If a set has more than one process, we just modify the runs so that all processes
inside a set receive the same set of messages, and if they fail, they fail at the same time, in the
same way. The proof also holds if any of Q, F or M −Q is 0.) We assume at least two learners, l1
and l2, and two proposers: the potentially malicious privileged proposer pl, and the proposer px.
We only consider the cases where pl proposes 0 or 1 (as this is sufficient to prove the lower
bound). Let m1 and m0 be the authenticated messages sent by pl in round 1, when pl is correct
and proposes 1 or 0, respectively. We say that an acceptor ai plays 1 (resp. (0) to some process
aj in round 2 of some run r if aj cannot distinguish, at round 2, run r from some run in which
2 We can however slightly simplify the proof L.2: proposer px may be removed. Recall that, in R3, proposal by
correct proposer px was introduced to ensure that l2 eventually learns a value. However, in R3
′ both pv and pw
are correct and proposes a value, and hence, even without the proposal of px, l2 is required to learn a value.
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(1) ai has received m1 (resp. m0) from pl in the first round, and (2) ai is correct. Furthermore, we
say that an acceptor ai plays a tuple (f1, f2,mq1, q1, q2) to some process aj in round 3 of some run
r if aj cannot distinguish, at round 3, the run r from some run in which (1) ai has received the
value f1 from F1, f2 from F2, mq1 from MQ1, q1 from Q1 and q2 from Q2 in round 2, and (2) ai is
correct. Here, ai receives a value xj (0 or 1) from Xj means that Xj played xj to ai in round 2 and
ai received this message during the round 2. If correct acceptor ai does not receive any message
from Xj in round 2, ai plays ′−′ in place of xj in round 3.
A very favorable partial run is a prefix of a very favorable run. Similarly, a favorable partial
run is a prefix of a favorable run. From our assumption, in every very favorable run (i.e., in the
synchronous run in which up to Q acceptors fail and in which a single correct privileged proposer
pl proposes), the correct learners learn the proposal value (of pl) by round 2. Furthermore, in every
favorable run (i.e., in the synchronous run in which up to Q′, Q < Q′ ≤ F , acceptors fail and in
which the single correct privileged proposer pl proposes), the correct learners learn the proposal
value (of pl) by round 3. Keeping in mind that A satisfies restricted authentication pattern, consider
the following runs: a favorable partial run R1 and a very favorable partial run R2. (The patterns
of the messages exchanged in the initial rounds of runs are depicted in Figure 3.)
R1: All processes, except F1 and l1, are correct. Proposer pl proposes 1 in round 1, F1 crashes
before sending any message in round 2, and learner l1 receives round 3 messages from all acceptors,
except from F1. From our assumption on A, l1 learns 1 at the end of round 3, and then l1 crashes
before sending any message in round 4.
R2: All processes, except l1 and Q1, are correct. Proposer pl proposes 0 in round 1, Q1 crashes
before sending any message in round 2, and learner l1 receives round 2 messages from all acceptors,
except from Q1. From our assumption on A, l1 learns 0 at the end of round 2, and then, l1 crashes
before sending any message in round 3.
We now construct three non-favorable runs.
R3: All processes are correct except (1) the proposer pl, which is malicious, (2) acceptor F2, which
crashes after sending the round 3 message to l1, and (3) l1 which crashes before sending any message
in round 4. In round 1, the proposer sends m1 to the acceptors F2, MQ1, Q1 and Q2, and m0 to
F1. In round 2, messages sent from F2 to F1, MQ1 and Q1 and messages sent from F1 to F2 are
lost (this is possible as F2 crashes). All other messages of round 2 are delivered by the end of round
2, except for the message sent from F1 to Q2, that is delivered in round 3. Note that, in round
3, F1 plays (0,−, 1, 1, 1), F2 plays (−, 1, 1, 1, 1), MQ1 plays (0,-,1,1,1), Q1 plays (0,−, 1, 1, 1) and
Q2 plays (-,1,1,1,1). Note that, at the end of round 2, F2 and Q2 cannot distinguish R3 from R1,
so, in round 3 they send the same messages as in round 3 of run R1, including those they send to
l1. Learner l1 crashes such that no process receive any round 4 message from l1. In round 4, the
correct proposer px proposes 0. Since a correct proposer proposes, eventually a correct learner l2
learns some value v ∈ {0, 1}, say at round K.
R4: All processes are correct except (1) the proposer pl and the acceptors MQ1 and Q1, which
are malicious, and (2) learner l1 which crashes before sending any message in round 4. In round
1, proposer pl sends m0 to acceptor F1, and m1 to F2, MQ1, Q1 and Q2. All messages in round
2 are delivered as in R3. From round 3 up to round K, all non-crashed processes receive messages
from all other non-crashed processes distinct from F2. Only round 3 message from F2 to l1 is de-
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Fig. 3. Illustration of proof L.3: lower bound on combining very fast learning (with authentication) and fast learning
without authentication - configuration C1a
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livered, and the delivery of all other messages sent by F2 up to round K, is delayed until round
K + 1. Furthermore, in round 3, malicious acceptors MQ1 and Q1 play (−, 1, 1, 1, 1) instead of
(0,−, 1, 1, 1) (as if they had received the same round 2 messages as in R1) to l1 (this is possible as
messages exchanged among acceptors in round 2 are not authenticated), and to all other processes
play according to the algorithm from that point on. Learner l1 upon receiving round 3 messages
from F2, (M −Q)1, Q1 and Q2, learns 1, as l1 cannot distinguish R4 from R1 (because l1 receives
the same set of messages from the acceptors in round 3 of both runs). Then learner l1 crashes before
sending any message in round 4. In round 4, the correct proposer px proposes 0. Up to round K,
all non-crashed processes receive messages from all other non-crashed processes distinct from F2
(i.e., all messages sent by F2 up to round K are delayed until round K + 1). At the end of round
K, no correct process can distinguish R4 from R3 (because every acceptor different from F2 plays
identical values in both runs). Hence, learner l2 learns v ∈ {0, 1} at round K. All correct processes
receive messages from all other correct processes (including F2) in rounds higher than K.
R5: All processes are correct except (1) the proposer pl and the acceptors MQ1 and Q2, which are
malicious, and (2) the learner l1 which crashes before sending any message in round 3. In round
1, proposer pl sends m1 to acceptor Q1, m0 to all other correct acceptors and both m0 and m1
to MQ1 and Q2. In round 2, acceptor Q1 plays 1 to all processes, acceptors F1 and F2 play 0 to
all processes. However, the malicious acceptors MQ1 and Q2 play 0 to learner l1 and play 1 to all
other processes. All round 2 messages are delivered as in R3. Furthermore, in round 3, Q2 plays
(−, 1, 1, 1, 1) and MQ1 plays (0,−, 1, 1, 1) (as per algorithm).3 Learner l1 receives round 2 message
from all acceptors except Q1. Clearly, at the end of round 2, l1 cannot distinguish R5 from R2
(because l1 receives the same set of messages from the acceptors in round 2 of both runs), and
hence, learns 0. Then learner l1 crashes before sending any message in round 3. In round 4, the
correct proposer px proposes 0. From round 3 up to round K, all non-crashed processes receive
messages from all other non-crashed processes distinct from F2 (i.e., all messages sent by F2 up to
round K are delayed until round K+1.) At the end of round K, no correct process can distinguish
R5 from R3 (because every acceptor different from F1 plays identical values in both runs), and
hence, learner l2 learns v ∈ {0, 1} at round K. All non-crashed processes receive messages from all
other non-crashed processes (including F2) in rounds higher than K.
Clearly, either R4 or R5 violates Agreement : l2 decides v in both runs, but l1 decides 1 in R4
and 0 in R5. However, in both runs, at most M acceptors are malicious: a contradiction with the
requirement that A does not violate Validity and Agreement if M acceptors are malicious.
In the case where Q > M , again we divide the set of acceptors, this time into four sets F1 and
F2, of size at most F , andM1 andM2, of size at mostM . To prove the lower bound in this case, we
can use similar runs we used in case where M ≥ Q, where acceptor M1 plays the role of acceptor
Q1 and M2 the role of Q2, and where acceptor MQ1 does not exist. 2
Now, we prove part 2 of the theorem, for configuration C2.
4.2 Configuration C2
First, we sketch the proof of the lower bound on the number of acceptors required for very fast
learning, even with authentication, in configuration C2. We refer to this proof as proof L.4.
3 The absence of authentication is exploited also in this point of the proof, where Q2 is allowed to play (−, 1, 1, 1, 1)
in round 3, although Q2 falsely claims that it received 1 from a correct acceptor F2 in round 2. If the messages
exchanged among acceptors were authenticated in round 2 this would not be possible.
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Proposition L.4. Let A be any algorithm and pl the only privileged proposer, which is, further-
more, also an acceptor. If, in every very favorable run of A every correct learner learns a value by
round 2, then Na > 2Q+ F + 2M − 2.
Proof L.4 (sketch). The proof is again a simple modification of proof L.1. However, if we try to
directly apply that proof, since pl is now an acceptor, in run R4 (and R5) M + 1 acceptors are
faulty, and in run R3 F acceptors are crash-stop faulty and one acceptor is malicious. Hence, from
the property of A, Agreement need not hold in R4 and R5, and Termination need not hold in R3.
Consequently, we cannot show the desired contradiction. Thus we modify proof L.1, such that M1
and M2 have only M − 1 acceptors each, and F1 has F − 1 acceptors.
Suppose by contradiction that Na ≤ 2Q+F +2M −2. Then, we can divide the set of acceptors,
that are distinct from pl, into five sets, Q1, Q2, F1, M1 and M2, where the first two sets are of
size at most Q, the third set is of size at most F − 1, and the last two sets are of size at most
M−1, respectively. In the runs, pl acts as proposer, as well as an acceptor (sending messages to the
learner and other acceptors from round 2). For each run, in round 1, pl receives the same message
as processes in M1, and in higher rounds, plays the same value as the processes in M1. We continue
as in the proof of L.1 to obtain a contradiction. The diagrams depicting the runs are presented
in Figure 4. Notice that, since M1 and M2 are each of size at most M − 1, in runs R24 and R25
run at most M acceptors are faulty, and in run R23 at most F acceptors are faulty (pl being the
additional faulty acceptor). 2
Now, we prove another bound on the possibility of very fast learning in configuration C2, with
a restriction that authentication cannot be used for very fast learning. We refer to this proof as
proof L.5.
Proposition L.5. Let A be any algorithm and pl the only privileged proposer, which is, further-
more, also an acceptor. If, in every very favorable run of A every correct learner learns by round 2
without using authentication, then Na > 2Q+ F + 2M − 2.
Proof L.5. Suppose by contradiction that Na ≤ Q + F + 2M . Then, we can divide the set of
acceptors, that are distinct from pl, into four sets, Q1, F1, M1 and M2, where the first set is of size
at most Q, the second set is of size at most F −1, and the last two sets is of sizeM . In the following
we say that an acceptor ai plays 2 in a run if no process different from ai can distinguish this run
from some run in which ai does not receive any message in round 1. We now construct five partial
runs to derive a contradiction. The runs are depicted in Figure 5; we give short descriptions below.
R31 and R32: Runs R1 and R2 are very favorable partial runs in which correct proposer pl pro-
poses 1 and 0 respectively, and l1 receives messages from all acceptors except Q1 in round 2. From
the property of A, it follows that l1 learns 1 and 0, respectively, at the end of round 2. Subsequently,
l1 crashes before sending any message in round 3.
R33: In run 3, every process except pl, l1 and F1 is correct. Malicious proposer pl sends m1 to M2,
m0 to M1, and does not send messages to F1 and Q1. F1 and pl crash before sending any message
in round 2. (Note that at most F acceptors crash.) From round 2, M1 plays 0, M2 plays 1, and Q1
plays 2. Proposer px proposes 0 in round 3. From the Termination property of A, it follows that
learner l2 decides some value v ∈ {0, 1}, say at round K.
R34: Every process except M1 and l1 are correct. Proposer pl proposes 1 and sends m1 to all
acceptors, of which, the message to Q1 is lost. From round 2 onwards, pl, M2 and F1 play 1 to all
processes, Q1 plays 2 to all processes, and malicious acceptor M1 plays 1 to l1 and 0 to all other
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Fig. 4. Illustration of proof L.4: lower bound on the possibility of very fast learning in configuration C2
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processes. At the end of round 2, l1 cannot distinguish R34 from R31, and hence, learns 1, and
then crashes before sending any message in round 3. Proposer px proposes 0 in round 3. However,
from round 3 to round K, all messages send by pl and F1 are lost. At the end of round K, learner
l2 cannot distinguish R34 from R33, and hence, learns v.
R35: This run is similar to R34, except that pl proposes 0, and instead of M1, M2 is malicious: it
plays 0 to l1 and plays 1 to all other processes. Learner l1 cannot distinguish R35 from R32, and
hence learns 0, and then crashes. As in R34, at the end of round K, l2 cannot distinguish R35 from
R33 and decides v.
Clearly, either R34 or R35 violates consensus Agreement : l2 decides v in both runs, but l1 decides
1 in R34 and 0 in R35. However, in both runs, at most M acceptors are faulty: a contradiction with
the requirement that A does not violate Validity and Agreement if M processes are faulty. 2
It is easy to see that runs R34 and R35 in proof L.5 cannot be constructed when authentication
is used in the first communication round (for very fast learning): M1 cannot play 1 as well as play 0
on receiving only messagem1 from correct proposer pl (and similarly for M2 in R35). To circumvent
this problem in the presence of authentication, we need to assume that pl is malicious in R34 and
R35, and hence (to maintain the upper bound M on the number of malicious acceptors), M1 and
M2 each containsM−1 acceptors. This gives us a lower bound of Q+F +2M−2 on Na. However,
this bound is strictly weaker than the bound Na > 2M + F + 2Q− 2, shown by proof L.4.
Finally we show how to modify proof L.3 to prove the rest of part 2 of the theorem, i.e., to prove
the bound on the number of acceptors required for achieving fast learning without authentication
combined with very fast learning (with or without authentication) in configuration C2. We refer to
this proof to proof L.6.
Proposition L.6. Let A be any algorithm and pl the only privileged proposer, which is, further-
more, also an acceptor, such that, in every very favorable (resp. favorable) run of A every correct
learner learns a value by round 2 (resp.3). In addition, letm be the message that is used for learning
in 3 rounds (fast learning), but m is not used for learning in 2 rounds (very fast learning). Sup-
pose also that in A no such a message m is authenticated. Then, Na > 2F +M−1+min(M−1, Q).
Proof L.6 (sketch). Basically, the proof relies on proof L.3 and we show how it can be reused in
configuration C2, in a similar way we reused proof L.1 in proof L.4. Namely, we use the runs similar
to runs R1-R5 of proof L.3; we only change the size of acceptors sets. Again, we distinguish two
cases: (1) the case where M ≥ Q + 1, and (2) the case where M < Q + 1. In the case (1), where
M ≥ Q + 1, we adapt proof L.3 in the following way: the size of the set F2 is now at most F − 1
(instead of at most F ) and the size of the set MQ1 is now at most M −Q− 1 (instead of at most
M −Q). Finally, one additional proposer/acceptor plays the roles of both the privileged proposer
pl and the acceptor that belongs to the set F2 in proof L.3.
In the case (2), where Q + 1 > M , again we divide the set of acceptors, this time into four
sets: F1, of size at most F , F2, of size at most F − 1, and M1 and M2, of size at most M − 1. To
prove the lower bound in this case, we can use similar runs we used in proof L.3, where acceptor
M1 plays the role of acceptor Q1 and M2 the role of Q2, and where acceptor MQ1 does not exist.
In addition, as in the case (1), where M ≥ Q+ 1, one additional proposer/acceptor plays the roles
of both the privileged proposer pl and the acceptor that belongs to the set F2 in proof L.3. 2
17
Q1
M2
pL
F1
M1
L1
learn 1
propose(1)
(a) Run 31
Q1
M2
pL
F1
M1
L1
learn 0
propose(0)
(b) Run 32
Q1
M2
pL
F1
M1
L1
propose(0) by pX
(c) Run 33
Q1
M2
pL
F1
M1
L1
learn 1
propose(0) by pX
(d) Run 34
Q1
M2
pL
F1
M1
L1
learn 0
propose(0) by pX
(e) Run 35
Sender plays 0
 
 
Byzantine fault
Delayed message
Process crash
Learning a value
Sender plays 1
Sender plays 2
(f) Legend
Fig. 5. Illustration of proof L.5: lower bound on the possibility of very fast learning without authentication in
configuration C2
18
5 The DGV Algorithm
To complete the proof of our theorem we describe here algorithms that match our lower bounds.
Our algorithms are all variants of the same Byzantine consensus algorithm.
In the following, we first detail one variant of the algorithm, denoted by DGVAlg.1, that matches
the lower bounds of part 1 of the theorem, for configuration C1 in the case of a single privileged
proposer. In fact, the variant we consider here also matches the interesting case of configuration
C2, where all proposers are acceptors and authentication is not used for very fast learning. Namely,
we show that:
Proposition Alg.1. There is a consensus algorithm A, with a single privileged proposer pl, such
that: if pl is not an acceptor (resp. if all proposers are acceptors), then in every very favorable run of
A every correct learner learns a value by round 2 without using authentication despite the failure of
Q acceptors whenever Na > max(2M+Q+2F ) (resp. Na > max(2(M−1)+Q+2F, 2M+Q+F )).
This matches the bound established by proposition L.1 (resp. the bound established by combining
propositions L.4 and L.5) from Section 4.
In addition, in every favorable run of A, every correct learner learns a value by round 3 despite
the failure of F acceptors:
(a) using authentication when Na ≤ 2F +M +min(M,Q) (resp. Na ≤ 2F +(M −1)+min(M −
1, Q)),
(b) without using authentication when Na > 2F +M +min(M,Q) (resp. Na > 2F + (M − 1) +
min(M − 1, Q)); (b) matches the bound established by proposition L.3 (resp. L.6) from Section 4.
As we discuss in the following, it is not difficult to modify DGVAlg.1 to obtain an algorithm
DGVAlg.2 that achieves the following:
Proposition Alg.2. There is a consensus algorithm A, with more than one privileged proposer,
such that, in every very favorable run of A in which a single privileged proposer pl proposes, every
correct learner learns a value by round 2 without using authentication despite the failure of Q
acceptors whenever Na > max(2M +Q+2F ). This matches the bound established by proposition
L.2 from Section 4.
In addition, in every favorable run of A, every correct learner learns a value by round 3 despite
the failure of F acceptors:
(a) using authentication when Na ≤ 2F +M +min(M,Q),
(b) without using authentication when Na > 2F +M +min(M,Q).
We prove proposition Alg.1 (and show how proposition Alg.2 can be derived) by proving the
correctness of DGVAlg.1 in Section 5.6. Finally, in Section 5.7, we describe DGV variants that match
the lower bounds from part 2 of our theorem, in configuration C2 in general, and highlight how
DGV can be efficiently adapted to the special case where Q = F .
5.1 Overview
DGV is composed of two parts: (1) a Locking module and (2) an Election module. In short, the
Locking module ensures consensus safety whereas the Election module ensures consensus liveness
under eventual synchrony assumption. The key element of DGV is its choose() function, within the
Locking module, that determines which value should be accepted by an acceptor at a given point
in time. The pseudocodes of Locking and Election modules are given in Section 5.5, in Figures 8
and 9, respectively.
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The algorithm proceeds in a sequence of views (Fig. 6). A view is a time frame in which some
pre-determined proposer is the leader. A leader is the only proposer whose messages are considered
by the acceptors within a view. DGV is based on the rotating coordinator paradigm [12], where
the leader of the view number w is pk, for k = w mod Np. The algorithm starts in the initial view,
InitV iew, which is a constant known to all processes (e.g., InitV iew = 0). Privileged proposer
pInit (where Init = 0 for Initview = 0), is the leader of InitV iew.
A view leader executes the Locking module of DGV, which consists of two phases: READ and
WRITE phase. Basically, the READ phase makes sure that, if any value was learned by some
learner in some previous view, it will be proposed in the new view. This is determined by the key
part of the READ phase, the choose() function. Since the algorithm starts in InitV iew, if pInit
proposes in the InitV iew, pInit skips the READ phase and executes only the WRITE phase. In
the WRITE phase, the leader tries to impose to learners its estimate of the decision value, with
the intermediation of acceptors. The WRITE phase allows very fast learning in very favorable runs
and at the same time provides graceful degradation, to allow fast learning in favorable runs. In
other words, if a correct privileged proposer pInit proposes at the very beginning of the algorithm,
it achieves very fast (resp. fast) learning in a very favorable (resp. favorable) run. If there is more
than one privileged proposer (proposition Alg.2), it is not difficult to obtain a variant of DGV where
we allow any privileged proposer (px) to achieve (very) fast learning, provided that px is the only
proposer that actually proposes a value in a (very) favorable run. This is done by setting InitV iew
to −1 and by allowing acceptors to accept a value from any privileged proposer px in InitV iew.
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Pre-Prepare CommitPrepare New-View
PhaseWRITE
Sign-REQ Sign-ACK New-View-ACK WRITE Phase
iView View i+1
<PREPARE> messages exchanged among acceptors are signed only if:
LPO is optional: only if <PREPARE> messages are not signed and Na < 2F + 2M + 1
Na < 2F +M +min(M,Q) + 1 in configuration C1
Na < 2F + (M − 1) +min(M − 1, Q) + 1 in configuration C2
View-Change
Lazy Proof Obtaining
(LPO)
READ Phase
Locking module
Election Election
If Na−Q same <PREPARE> messages received, then learn value
If Na− F same <COMMIT> messages received, then learn value
Fig. 6. Communication pattern and structure of DGV
A view leader that is suspected of not making any progress is changed on the basis of timeouts
within the Election module of the algorithm. As soon as the acceptors initialize the algorithm, they
start a timer that is permanently stopped as soon as they hear from at least one correct learner
that it had learned a value. Otherwise, upon expiration of the timer, the acceptor suspects the
leader. If b(Na +M)/2 + 1c correct acceptors suspect the current leader, the leader is (eventually)
changed. The set of b(Na +M)/2 + 1c acceptors is a non-malicious majority set, i.e., every set of
size b(Na +M)/2 + 1c, for every run r, always contains a majority of non-malicious acceptors in
r. 4.
In the following, we describe the WRITE phase of the Locking module.
4 We prove this statement in Section 5.6 (Lemma 2).
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5.2 WRITE Phase
In the first communication round, the leader sends the PRE-PREPARE message to all acceptors,
including the proposal value v and the view number w, together with the WriteProof , set of
authenticated messages that certifies the proposal value v. We come back to the generation of this
set in Section 5.4. For the time being, it is enough to assume that the acceptors can check the
validity of the WriteProof . In InitV iew, WriteProof = nil.
Every acceptor ai, if it is in view w, upon reception of the PRE-PREPARE message from the
leader with the validWriteProof , adds the PRE-PREPARE message to its set Kai (for simplicity,
we say that: (a) ai pre-prepares v in w and (b)Kai := (v, w)). Acceptors pre-prepare a value at most
once in the particular view. Then, acceptors begin the second communication round by echoing the
PRE-PREPARE message to learners, within a PREPARE message, with the same value and the
view number. The Writeproof set does not have to be echoed. Furthermore, acceptors send the
PREPARE message, to all other acceptors. IfNa ≤ 2F+M+min(M,Q) in the case of configuration
C1 or Na ≤ 2F +(M−1)+min(M−1, Q) in the case of configuration C2, the PREPARE messages
exchanged among the acceptors are authenticated.
Upon reception of Na −Q PREPARE messages from different acceptors, with the same value
v and view number w, a learner learns v. Upon reception of Na − F PREPARE messages from
different acceptors, with the same value v and view number w, that furthermore match the value
and the view number in Kai and the current view of the acceptor, acceptor ai adds these PREPARE
messages to its set Pai . For simplicity, we say that: (a) ai prepares v in w and (b) Kai := (v, w)
(when we say that ai accepts v in w, we mean that ai pre-prepares or prepares v in w). Then,
ai sends a COMMIT message (third communication round) containing v and w to all learners.
Upon reception of Na −F COMMIT messages with the same v and view number w from different
acceptors, learner learns v, unless it had already learned a value.
5.3 Changing Leader
Upon initialization, acceptors trigger the timer SuspectT imeout, that is initially equal to some value
InitT imeout, conveniently chosen with respect to the estimates of∆c and∆auth. If SuspectT imeout
expires, the acceptor suspects the current leader. If a sufficient number of acceptors suspect the
current leader, then the leader is changed. Basically, the leader of the view is changed if it is faulty,
or if the run is not synchronous. This is done within the Election module of DGV.
When an acceptor suspects the leader, it sends the signed VIEW-CHANGE message to the
leader of the next view, doubles the SuspectT imeout and triggers it again. If the new leader is
not elected until the expiration of SuspectT imeout, the acceptors send signed VIEW-CHANGE
messages to the next leader, and so on. When some proposer pj receives b(Na+M)/2+ 1c VIEW-
CHANGE messages from different acceptors, with valid signatures and the same view number w,
such that w mod Np = j, pj becomes the leader (we say pj is elected). A leader uses a set of
received signed VIEW-CHANGE messages as the view proof (V iewProofw), the proof that it is a
legitimate leader of the view w. The new leader sends to all acceptors the NEW-VIEW message
containing the view number and the view proof. Upon reception of a valid NEW-VIEW message
for a higher view, an acceptor updates its view number and view proof, and updates the value for
future timeouts (line 17, Fig. 9). The values for SuspectT imeout are chosen in such way that all
acceptors trigger the same timeout value after sending a VIEW-CHANGE message for a particular
view number.
SuspectT imeout is stopped when the acceptor receives the confirmation from some learner that
it learned a value. When a learner learns a value v, it sends (periodically) the signed DECISION
message that contains a value v to all acceptors and learners (for presentation simplicity, we use
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authenticated DECISION messages from learners, to enable acceptors to halt Locking and Elec-
tion modules. The authentication can be avoided in this case by using a variation of consistent
broadcast of [4], as we show in Appendix 5.7). When an acceptor receives a DECISION message
from some learner, it stops permanently the SuspectT imeout and halts Locking and Election mod-
ules. Learners that do not learn a value for some time, start to periodically query acceptors for
the DECISION message. Upon reception of such a query, an acceptor, if it has received a signed
DECISION message from some learner, forwards the DECISION message to all learners. Upon
reception of a correctly signed DECISION message that contains a value v, a learner learns v if it
did not already learn a value. Note that a learner can learn a value on the basis of a DECISION
message that is correctly signed by some learner, because learners are assumed not to be malicious.
5.4 READ Phase and choose() function
Upon being elected, a new leader of view w, pw, sends a 〈NEW −V IEW,w, V iewProofw〉 message
to all acceptors, where V iewProofw is the proof, based on authenticated messages, that pw is a
legitimate, elected leader of w. Upon reception of the NEW-VIEW message for view w, sent by pw,
an acceptor ai, if it is in wai ≥ w, replies to pw with the signed NEW-VIEW-NACK message that
includes the valid proof, V iewProofwai , of the fact that it is in wai ≥ w, (where V iewProofwai , is
view proof ai received from the leader of wai).
Else, ai updates its view number (wai) to w, and its view proof (V iewProofwai ) to V iewProofw.
If Na−M−2F > M or PREPARE messages in theWRITE phase are authenticated, then ai replies
with the signed NEW-VIEW-ACK message, containing its sets Kai and Pai . Else, if Na−M−2F ≤
M and authentication is not used in WRITE phase, ai sends a 〈SIGN − REQ, vai , wai〉 message
to the set of acceptors from which ai received 〈PREPARE, vai , wai〉 messages from the set Pai
(when Na −M − 2F ≤ M , acceptors have to keep track of PREPARE messages they have sent).
Upon reception of SIGN-REQ message, acceptors respond with a signed SIGN-ACK message that
contains a signed PREPARE message corresponding to request SIGN-REQ if they have sent that
PREPARE message. As liveness has to be guaranteed only if at most F acceptors fail, in this case,
a non-malicious acceptor ai is guaranteed to obtain Na − 2F ≥M + 1 SIGN-ACK messages. The
acceptor ai includes the Na − 2F received signed SIGN-ACK messages in the NEW-VIEW-ACK
message that it sends to the leader of the new view. The pair (vai , wai) reported by Pai in the
NEW-VIEW-ACK message sent by ai is considered valid by the leader of the new view, only if it
is accompanied with a matching, valid set of Na− 2F signed SIGN-ACK messages. This technique
is a generalization of what is known as a “lazy” proof obtaining (LPO) technique [5].
Upon reception of Na − F valid NEW-VIEW-(N)ACK messages, if there is any valid NEW-
VIEW-NACK message, the leader updates its view number and aborts its current proposal. If the
leader did not receive any NEW-VIEW-NACK message, adds Na − F received NEW-VIEW-ACK
messages to the setWriteProof . We define the candidate values of theWriteProof in the following
way:
Definition 1 (Candidate values). We say that a value v is Candidate-2 or Candidate-3 value
in the set WriteProof , with the cardinalities S2v and S
3
v , respectively, if:
- (Candidate-2) S2v ≥ Na −Q −M − F different Kai sets of NEW-VIEW-ACK messages in
the WriteProof contain the value v (Kai = (v, ∗)).
- (Candidate-3) S3v ≥ Na− 2F −M different valid Pai sets of NEW-VIEW-ACK messages in
the WriteProof contain the value v, associated5 with the same view number w (Pai = (v, w)).
5 We say that the view number w and the value v are associated if there is some set K∗ or P∗, such that Kai = (v, w)
or Pai = (v, w). Note that one value can be associated with multiple view numbers and vice versa.
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Finally, a new leader pw chooses the value that it is going to propose to acceptors using the
choose() function, which we give in Figure 7.
1:choose(v,WriteProof) returns(v, view) is {
2: view2, view3 := −1; v2, v3 := nil; flag := true
3: sort all (if any) candidate-3 values by their associated view no.; let w3 be the highest among those view no.
4: if ∃ a single candidate-3 value v′3 associated with w3 then v3 := v′3; view3 := w3
5: elseif ∃ more than one such a value then flag := false; abort
6: endif
7: if there is a single candidate-2 value v′ then v2 := v’;
8: elseif there are two candidate-2 values v′ and v′′ then
9: order sets K′∗ and K
′′
∗ , that contain v
′ and v′′, respectively, by descending view numbers
10: let view′ and view′′ be the view numbers ofM+1st highest view number associated to v′ and v′′, respectively.
11: if view′ > view′′ then v2 := v’ elseif view′′ > view′ then v2 := v”;
12: else % view’=view”
13: if NEW-VIEW-ACK sent by leader of view view′ = view′′ is in Writeproof then abort
14: elseif S2v′ ≥ Na −Q− F −M + 1 then v2 := v′ elseif S2v′′ ≥ Na −Q− F −M + 1 then v2 := v′′ endif
15: endif
16: endif
17: endif
18: if v2 6= nil then view2 := M + 1st highest view number associated to v2 in K∗ sets endif
19: if view2 > view3 then return(v2, view2) elseif view3 > view2 return(v3, view3) else
20: if view2 = view3 6= −1 and (v2 = v3 or (v2 6= v3 and S3v3 > M ) or PREPARE messages authenticated)
21: then return(v3, view3)
22: elseif view2 = view3 6= −1 and v2 6= v3 and S3v3 ≤M and PREPARE messages not authenticated then
23: if system configuration is C1 then flag := false; abort
24: else % system configuration is the case of C2 (all proposers are also acceptors)
25: if NEW-VIEW-ACK sent by leader of view view2 = view3 is in Writeproof then abort
26: else case
27: ((S3v3 ≥ Na −M − 2F + 1 and S2v2 < Na −Q−M − F + 1) or S3v3 =M): return(v3, view3)
28: (S3v3 < Na −M − 2F + 1 and S2v2 ≥ Na −Q−M − F + 1): return(v2, view2)
29: (M > S3v3 ≥ Na −M − 2F + 1 and S2v2 ≥ Na −Q−M − F + 1): flag := false; abort
30: endif
31: endif
32: endif
33: endif
34: return(v,⊥)
}
Fig. 7. Choose() function
The function choose() has two input parameters: (1) v, the initial proposal value of pw and the
Writeproof , set of the Na−F valid NEW-VIEW-ACK messages for view w. The main idea behind
choose() is that, if a value v2 (resp. v3) was learned by some learner in some previous view w2 (resp.
w3) upon reception of Na−Q (resp. Na−F ) 〈PREPARE, v2, w2〉 (resp. 〈COMMIT, v2, w2〉) mes-
sages, then v2 (resp. v3) will certainly be the candidate-2 (resp. candidate-3) value in Writeproof
of view w (and every subsequent view). This is true as out of Na−Q (resp. Na−F ) acceptors that
sent the same PREPARE (resp. COMMIT ) message to learners, there are at least Na−Q−M −F
(resp. Na − 2F −M) non-malicious acceptors whose NEW-VIEW-ACK messages will be part of
the Writeproof .
However, it may happen that there are multiple candidate values in the Writeproof . We say
that the candidate-2 value v2 is associated with a view number view2, where view2 is the M + 1st
highest view number associated to v2 in Kai sets of the NEW-VIEW-ACK messages that belong
to the Writeproof . In addition, we say that the candidate-3 value v3 is associated with a view
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number view3, if for at least Na − 2F −M valid Pai sets of the NEW-VIEW-ACK messages that
belong to the Writeproof Pai = (v3, view3). If there is more than one candidate value in the
Writeproof happens, a candidate value with the highest associated view number will be selected.
If there are multiple candidate values associated with the same (highest) view number, choose()
is finely tuned to always return a value that was learned in some previous view (if any), rather
than some other candidate value. For details on how this is obtained, we refer the reader to the
correctness proof of this DGV variant given in Section 5.6. In any case, if some value v was learned
by some learner in some previous view, choose() will never return a value different than v (to ensure
Agreement). Informally, when there is a dispute between two (or even more) candidate values with
the same associated view number w, where one of the candidate values was actually learned in some
previous view, either: (a) a leader of w was malicious (in case this proposer is also an acceptor),
or (b) the Writeproof contains malicious acceptors. In case (a), if the Writeproof contains the
message from the leader of w, choose() aborts. If this is not the case, we exploit the fact that one
malicious acceptor (leader of view w) is out of the Writeproof so we adapt our calculations with
respect to this (e.g., a candidate-2 value that was actually learned will have a cardinality of at
least Na −Q−M −F +1 in the Writeproof , see lines 13-14, Fig. 7). In case (b), where malicious
acceptor is not necessarily the leader of the disputed view w, choose() aborts again.
When choose(v,Writeproof) aborts (lines 5, 13, 23, 25 and 29, Fig. 7), we are sure that the
Writeproof contains at least one malicious acceptor. Therefore, a new leader can wait for one
additional NEW-VIEW-ACK message (Na − F + 1st), when it invokes choose() on every possible
valid Writeproof , i.e. on every subset of received NEW-VIEW-ACK messages of size Na − F . If
choose aborts on every such subset, new leader waits for another NEW-VIEW-ACK message and
so on. Termination is guaranteed in presence of Na − F correct acceptors as choose() never aborts
when the Writeproof consists of NEW-VIEW-ACK messages sent only by the correct acceptors.
Upon finding aWriteproof for which choose() returns a value v, the new leader sends the PRE-
PREPARE message to all acceptors, in the same way as the leader of InitV iew, except that this
time WriteProof 6= nil. An acceptor checks the Writeproof (as mentioned in Section 5.2) using
the same choose() function and accepts the PRE-PREPARE message if the proposed value v can
be extracted from the WriteProof . Then the WRITE phase continues as described in Section 5.2.
5.5 Modularizing DGV
We distinguish two main parts of the DGV algorithm. One is the Locking part of the algorithm,
described in Figure 8, which consists of the READ and the WRITE phase. This part of the
algorithm captures the Safety properties of the algorithm - Validity and Agreement. The two phases
of the Locking part are explained in Section 5.
Note that at lines 34 and 37 in the Locking module (Fig. 8), in the WRITE phase, acceptors
and learners can wait for b(Na+M)/2+1c instead of Na−F PREPARE and COMMIT messages,
respectively, when the PREPARE messages exchanged among acceptors in the WRITE phase are
authenticated (line 32, Fig. 8. The set of b(Na +M)/2 + 1c acceptors is a non-malicious majority
set, i.e., every set of size b(Na +M)/2 + 1c, for every run r, always contains a majority of non-
malicious acceptors in r. This optimization of DGV makes it possible to have, in the described
case, fast learning in the synchronous run in which a privileged proposer is correct, despite the
failure of Na − b(Na +M)/2 + 1c ≥ F acceptors.
The second part of the algorithm is the Election module, which is described in Figure 9. The
Election module, under the assumption of an eventually synchronous system, provides liveness.
This part of the algorithm elects new leaders on the basis of timeouts.
In Figure 10 we give the simple wrap-up algorithm. Upon entering a view in which proposer pj
is a leader (this is done within a Election module of the algorithm, pj executes the Locking module
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at every proposer pj:
propose(v,w, V iewProofw) is
1: WriteProof := nil
2: if (w 6= Initview) then
% READ phase
3: send to all acceptors 〈NEW − V IEW,w, V iewProofw〉
4: wait until reception of N − F valid signed
〈NEW − V IEW − (N)ACK,w,Kai , Pai , proofPai , V iewProofwai , wai〉 messages,
where ∀Kai = (∗, view < w) and ∀Pai = (∗, view < w)
5: WriteProof := set of Na − F received 〈NEW − V IEW − (N)ACK〉 messages
6: if received any valid 〈NEW − V IEW −NACK〉 message then
7: w := highest valid wai from WriteProof
8: V iewProofw := V iewProofwai corresponding to view w
9: return
10: else choose(v,WriteProof) endif
11: end
% WRITE phase
12: send to all acceptors 〈PRE − PREPARE, v,w,WriteProof〉
at every acceptor aj:
% READ phase
13:upon reception of 〈NEW − V IEW,w, V iewProofw〉 from pi
14: if (waj < w) and (V iewProofw matches w) then
15: waj := w; V iewProofviewaj := V iewProofw
16: proofPaj := nil
17: if (2F +M +min(M,Q) < Na ≤ 2F + 2M in configuration C1) or
(2F +M − 1 +min(M − 1, Q) < Na ≤ 2F + 2M in configuration C2) then % LPO
18: send 〈SIGN −REQ,Paj .v, Paj .w〉 to all acceptors whose 〈PREPARE, v,w〉 message is in Paj
19: upon reception of Na − 2F signed 〈SIGN −ACK〉 messages that correspond to sent 〈SIGN −REQ〉
20: proofPaj := set of received signed 〈SIGN −ACK〉 messages
21: endif
22: send signed 〈NEW − V IEW −ACK,w,Kaj , Paj , proofPaj , nil, nil〉 to pi
23: else
24: send signed 〈NEW − V IEW −NACK,w, nil, nil, nil, proofaj , waj 〉 to pi
25:upon reception of 〈SIGN −REQ, v,w〉 from ai % LPO
26: if 〈PREPARE, v,w〉 already sent then send 〈SIGN −ACK〈PREPARE, v,w〉σaj 〉 to ai endif
% WRITE phase
27:upon reception of 〈PRE − PREPARE, v,w,WriteProof, fresh〉 from pi, with a valid WriteProofw
28: if (waj = w) and (w mod Np = i) and 〈PRE − PREPARE, ∗,w, ∗, ∗〉 received for the 1st time and
((waj = InitV iew) or (v matches choose(v,WriteProof))) then
29: Kaj := received 〈PRE − PREPARE〉 message {Kaj := (v, w)}
30: m := 〈PREPARE, v,w〉
31: send m to all learners
32: if (Na ≤ 2F +M +min(M,Q) in configuration C1) or
(Na ≤ 2F +M − 1 +min(M − 1, Q) in configuration C2) then m := 〈m, 〈m〉σaj 〉
33: send m to all acceptors
34:upon reception of Na − F signed 〈〈PREPARE, v,w〉, . . .〉 matching Kaj , w = waj
35: Paj := set of received 〈PREPARE〉 messages {Paj := (v, w)}
36: send to all learners 〈COMMIT, v,w〉
at every learner lj:
37:upon reception of Na −Q 〈PREPARE, v,w〉 or Na − F 〈COMMIT, v,w〉 with the same v,w
38: if lj has not yet learned a value then learn(v) endif
Fig. 8. Pseudocode of the DGV Locking module
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at every learner lj :
1:upon learning a value v
2: periodically send signed 〈DECISION, v〉 to all acceptors and all other learners
3:upon reception of a valid signed 〈DECISION, v〉
4: if lj has not yet learned a value then learn(v) endif
5:upon value not learned
6: wait some preset time; send 〈DECISION − PULL〉 to all acceptors;
at every acceptor aj :
7:upon initialization
8: SuspectT imeout := InitT imeout
9: trigger(SuspectT imeout)
10:upon expiration of (SuspectT imeout)
11: SuspectT imeout := SuspectT imeout ∗ 2
12: NextV iewaj := NextV iewaj + 1; NextLeader = NextV iewaj mod Np
13: send to pNextLeader 〈V IEW − CHANGE,NextV iewj〉σaj
14: trigger(SuspectT imeout)
15:upon reception of a valid 〈NEW − V IEW,w, V iewProofw〉, such that w > waj ;
16: NextV iewaj := w
17: SuspectT imeout := InitT imeout ∗ 2w
18:upon reception of a valid 〈DECISION, v〉 from some learner;
19: stop(SuspectT imeout)
20:upon reception of a 〈DECISION − PULL〉 from some learner lj
21: if received a valid signed 〈DECISION, v〉 then
22: forward 〈DECISION, v〉 to lj
23: endif
at every proposer pj :
24:upon reception of b(Na +M)/2 + 1c signed 〈V IEW − CHANGE,NextV iewai〉 with the same NextV iewai
25: if (NextV iewai mod Np = j) and (NextV iewai > wpj ) then
26: V iewProofwpj := ∪ received signed 〈V IEW − CHANGE,NextV iewai〉
27: wpj := NextV iewi
28: send to all proposers signed 〈NEW − V IEW,wpj , V iewProofwpj 〉
29:upon reception of a valid signed 〈NEW − V IEW,w’, V iewProofw’〉, such that w′ > wpj
30: wpj := w’
31: V iewProofwpj := V iewProofw’
Fig. 9. Pseudocode of the DGV Election module
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of the algorithm. We assume that privileged proposer proposes in the Initview due to an external
event. To achieve (very) fast learning privileged proposer should propose at the very beginning of
the algorithm.
at every process PRj :
1: wPRj := InitV iew := NextV iewaj := 0 {Initialization}
2: V iewProofwPRj := nil
3:upon(wpj mod Np = j) and (wpj 6= InitV iew)
4: propose(v, wpj , V iewProofwpj ) {propose() can be invoked also due to an external event}
Fig. 10. Pseudocode of the DGV Wrap-Up algorithm
5.6 DGV Correctness
In this section, we prove the correctness of the DGV variation described in Section 5 (DGVAlg.1,
i.e., we prove proposition Alg.1. First, we give few definitions.
Definition 2 (Value learned in a view). We say that a value v is Learned-2 or Learned-3 in
view w, if there is a learner l that eventually learns a value by receiving (respectively):
– (Learned-2) 〈PREPARE, v, w〉 messages from Na −Q different acceptors.
– (Learned-3) 〈COMMIT, v, w〉 messages from Na − F different acceptors.
Definition 3 (Pre-prepares). We say that an acceptor ai pre-prepares a value v in view w,
if it eventually adds a 〈PRE − PREPARE, v, w, ∗, ∗〉 message to its Kai set, i.e., if eventually
Kai := (v, w) (line 29, Fig. 8).
Definition 4 (Prepares).We say that an acceptor ai prepares a value v in view w, if it eventually
adds a Na−F different signed 〈PREPARE, v, w〉 messages to its Pai set, i.e., if eventually Pai :=
(v, w) (line 35, Fig. 8).
Definition 5 (Accepts).We say that an acceptor ai accepts a value v in view w, if it pre-prepares
or prepares v in view w.
It is trivial to see that if a learner learns a value, it was Learned-2 or Learned-3 in some view.
Note that if non-malicious acceptor ai prepared a value v in view w, it follows that ai pre-prepared
a value v in view w.
We proceed with the correctness proof by proving two simple, yet crucial lemmas.
Lemma 1. Na − F ≥ b(Na +M)/2 + 1c.
Proof. Our algorithm assumes Na > 2F + M (general bound on solvability of consensus). If
Na = 2F +M + 1, then Na − F = F +M + 1, while b(Na +M)/2 + 1c = bF +M + 3/2c =
F +M +1. Therefore, Na−F = b(Na +M)/2+ 1c. On the other hand, if Na > 2F +M +1, then
Na ≥ 2F +M + 2⇒ 2Na − 2F ≥ Na +M + 2. As Na +M + 2 ≥ 2b(Na +M)/2 + 1c, we conclude
that Na − F ≥ b(Na +M)/2 + 1c.
Lemma 2. – (a) Two sets, A and B, each containing at least b(Na + M)/2 + 1c acceptors,
intersect in at least one non-malicious acceptor.
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– (b) Set A of Na − F acceptors and set B of b(Na +M)/2 + 1c acceptors, intersect in at least
one non-malicious acceptor.
– (c) Two sets, A and B, each containing at least Na − F acceptors, intersect in at least one
non-malicious acceptor.
– (d) Set A of Na −Q different acceptors and set B of b(Na +M)/2 + 1c acceptors, intersect in
at least one non-malicious acceptor.
– (e) Set A of Na −Q different acceptors and set B of Na − F different acceptors intersect in at
least Na −Q−M − F non-malicious acceptors.
– (f) Every set of at least b(Na +M)/2 + 1c acceptors is a non-malicious majority.
– (g) Every set of at least Na −Q−M − F acceptors contains at least M + 1 acceptors.
Proof. (a). From the inequality Na +M + 1 ≤ 2b(Na +M)/2 + 1c, it is obvious that A and B
intersect in at least M + 1 acceptors. As at most M acceptors are malicious, we conclude that A
and B intersect in at least one non-malicious acceptor.
(b),(c). Follow directly from Lemma 1 and part (a) of the lemma.
(d). Q ≤ F ⇒ Na − Q ≥ Na − F . Applying part (b) of the lemma, we conclude that A and B
intersect in at least one non-malicious acceptor.
(e). Sets A and B intersect in at least (Na − Q) + (Na − F ) − Na = Na − Q − F acceptors, out
of which are at most M malicious. Therefore, A and B intersect in at least Na − Q − M − F
non-malicious acceptors.
(f). Straightforward from part (a) of the lemma.
(g). In configuration C1: Na ≥ 2M + F + 2Q+ 1⇒ Na −Q−M − F ≥M +Q+ 1 ≥M + 1.
In configuration C2: Na ≥ 2M + F +Q+ 1⇒ Na −Q−M − F ≥M + 1.
Lemma 3. If two values v and v′ are Learned-2 in view w, then v = v′.
Proof. Suppose v 6= v′. From Def. 2, a set X of at least Na −Q acceptors sent 〈PREPARE, v, w〉
messages and a set Y of at least Na − Q acceptors sent 〈PREPARE, v′, w〉 messages. As sets X
and Y intersect in at least Na−2Q acceptors, out of which at least Na−2Q−M are non-malicious,
and Na ≥ 2Q + 2M + F + 1, we have Na − 2Q −M ≥ 1. That is, there exists a non-malicious
acceptor that has sent different PREPARE messages in the same view: a contradiction.
Lemma 4. If v is Learned-2 in view w, and a set of at least Na−F acceptors sent the 〈PREPARE, v′, w〉
message, then v = v′.
Proof. Suppose v 6= v′. From Def. 2, a set X of at least N −Q acceptors sent 〈PREPARE, v, w〉
messages in the view w. Let Y be the set of at least Na−F acceptors that sent 〈PREPARE, v′, w〉.
As sets X and Y intersect in at least one non-malicious acceptor ai (Lemma 2(d,g)), we conclude
that ai sent different PREPARE messages in the same view: a contradiction.
Lemma 5. If v is Learned-2 in view w, and v′ is Learned-3 in the same view w, then v = v′.
Proof. This Lemma is a simple corollary of the Lemma 4.
Lemma 6. If two values v and v′ are Learned-3 in view w, then v = v′.
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Proof. Suppose v 6= v′. From Def. 2, a set X of at least Na − F acceptors sent 〈COMMIT, v, w〉
messages and a set Y of at least Na − F acceptors sent 〈COMMIT, v′, w〉 messages. As sets X
and Y intersect in at least one non-malicious acceptor ai (Lemma 2(c)), we conclude that ai sent
different COMMIT messages with the same view number: a contradiction.
Lemma 7. No two different values can be learned in the same view.
Proof. Follows directly from Lemmas 3, 5 and 6.
Lemma 8. If choose(v,WriteProof) in view w′ returns (v, w) and v is a candidate value in
Writeproof , then at least one non-malicious acceptor ai pre-prepared the value v in a view higher
or equal to w.
Proof. Assume choose(v,Writeproof) in view w′ returns v, w where v is a candidate-3 value in the
Writeproof . From Definition 1, it follows that a set X of at least Na− 2F −M acceptors reported
a valid P∗ = (v, w). A P∗ set is valid if: (a) PREPARE messages exchanged among acceptors are
signed, (b) PREPARE messages are not signed, but P∗ is accompanied with a “lazy” proof of
Na− 2F signed SIGN-ACK messages (when Na ≤ 2F +2M) and (c) PREPARE messages are not
signed, but Na ≥ 2F + 2M + 1. We prove that in each of these three exhaustive cases, there is a
set Y of at least Na − F acceptors that sent 〈PREPARE, v, w〉 messages.
Case (a): P∗ sets that acceptors from set X reported contain signed PREPARE messages from
Na −F acceptors. Applying Lemma 2(f) and Lemma 1, we conclude that a set Y contains at least
one non-malicious acceptor ai that pre-prepared v in view w.
Case (b): Every P∗ set is basically accompanied with Na − 2F signatures. As Na ≥ 2F +M +1⇒
Na − 2F ≥ M + 1 we conclude that at least one of these signatures comes from a non-malicious
acceptor ai that pre-prepared v in view w.
Case (c): A cardinality of set X is S3v ≥ Na − 2F −M ≥M + 1, i.e., at least one of the P∗ sets is
reported by the non-malicious acceptor ai that pre-prepared v in view w.
Assume now that w is a candidate-2 value in the Writeproof . This implies (Definition 1) that
there exists a set X of at least Na − Q −M − F acceptors that reported that they pre-prepared
v, out of which a set Y of at least M + 1 acceptors pre-prepared v in the view higher or equal to
w (note that Lemma 2(g) implies that the set X contains at least M + 1 acceptors). As there are
at most M malicious acceptors, we conclude that the set Y contains at least one non-malicious
acceptor that pre-prepared the value v in a view higher or equal to w.
Lemma 9. (Validity) If a learner learns a value v, then some proposer proposed v.
Proof. If a learner learns v in w, v was pre-prepared by Na − Q > M acceptors or prepared by
Na − F > M acceptors in view w, i.e. at least one non-malicious acceptor accepted v in w.
We prove the following statement using induction on view numbers: if a non-malicious acceptor
accepts v, then v was some proposer proposed v.
Base Step: We prove that if a non-malicious acceptor accepted v in Initview, then some proposer
proposed v.
As non-malicious acceptors accept only values proposed by pInit, we conclude that v was pro-
posed by some proposer.
Remark: Again, we highlight that it is impossible to ensure that a malicious proposer PInit, on
proposing a value, will not pretend that it has proposed a different value. A more precise definition
of Validity would be: if a learner l learns a value v in run r, then there is a run r′ (possibly different)
such that some proposer proposes v in r′, and l cannot distinguish r from r′. Proof that corresponds
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to this Validity definition follows the same footsteps as this proof.
Inductive Hypothesis (IH): For every view w, k > w ≤ Initview, if a non-malicious acceptor
accepted v in w, then some proposer proposed v.
Inductive Step: We prove the statement is true for the view k. In view k acceptor accept only values
returned by choose(∗,Writeproof), where Writeproof is valid. If choose(∗,Writeproof) returns
a candidate value v, by Lemma 8, some non-malicious acceptor accepted v in view w,w < k, and
by IH, v was proposed by some proposer. If choose(∗,Writeproof) returns v in line 34, Figure 7,
then v is initial proposal value of the leader of k. We conclude (with the same remark as in the
Base Step) that v was proposed by some proposer.
Lemma 10. After sending a NEW-VIEW-ACK message for view w, a non-malicious acceptor
cannot accept a value v with view number w′ < w.
Proof. It is not difficult to see that this lemma holds, as non-malicious acceptor aj accept a value
v with view number w′ only if aj is in view lower or equal to w′. As aj already replied with a
NEW-VIEW-ACK message for view w > w′ and thus is in view waj ≥ w > w′, aj cannot accept v.
Lemma 11. If w is the lowest view number in which some value v is Learned-2, then no non-
malicious acceptor ai pre-prepares any value v′, v′ 6= v in any view higher than w.
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction on view numbers.
Base Step: First, we prove that no non-malicious acceptor ai can pre-prepare any value different
from v in view w + 1. A non-malicious acceptor ai in w + 1 pre-prepares a value v′ only if the
emphchoose() function on the valid WriteProof of view w+1 returns v′. Therefore, it is sufficient
to prove that for any valid Writeproof , choose(*,Writeproof) returns v.
Assume, without loss of generality, that v was Learned-2 by learner l in view w. Then (Def. 2, 3),
a set X of at least Na −Q acceptors pre-prepared v in w. As the valid WriteProof of view w + 1
consists of NEW-VIEW-ACK messages from a set Y of Na − F acceptors, there is a subset Z of
the set X ∩ Y , of cardinality SZ ≥ Na − Q − F −M , that contains only non-malicious acceptors
(Lemma 2(e)). By Lemma 10, every acceptor ai ∈ Z pre-prepared v in w, before replying with
the NEW-VIEW-ACK message to the leader of view w + 1. In the meantime, no acceptor from Z
pre-prepared any other value, as this would mean that it would be in the higher view then w + 1
when replying with NEW-VIEW-ACK for w + 1, which is impossible. Therefore, ∀ai ∈ Z, (Kai =
(v, w)) ∈WriteProof . As SZ ≥ Na−Q−F −M , v is the candidate-2 value in Writeproof of view
w+1, withM+1st highest view number (that exists, as follows from Lemma 2(g)) equal to w. Note
that, in the case the size of Z equals Na−Q−F−M and v was Learned-2 by l in view w, then every
acceptor aj , out of F acceptors whose NEW-VIEW-ACK messages are not in the WriteProof , is
non-malicious and aj pre-prepared v in w, before aj replied with the NEW-VIEW-ACK for view
w + 1 (if aj replied to the NEW-VIEW message for view w + 1 at all).
If v is the only candidate-2 value in the WriteProof , then v2 := v (line 7, Fig. 7) and
view2 assignw (line 18, Fig. 7).
If there is another candidate-2 value v′6 with its M + 1st view number view′ < w (chosen as in
lines 9-10, Fig. 7, again v2 := v and view2 := w (line 11, Fig. 7). As it is impossible that view′ > w
in the valid Writeproof of view w + 1 (line 4, Fig. 8), we now consider the case where view′ = w.
In this case, it is not difficult to see that the leader of view w is faulty. Indeed, there is a set of
at least Na − Q − F −M ≥ M + 1 acceptors (Lemma 2(g)) that accepted v in the view w, and
another set of at least M + 1 acceptors that accepted v′ in the view w, which implies that there
are two non-malicious acceptors which accepted different values in w, i.e., the leader of view w is
6 This case is not possible in configuration C1.
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malicious. From the choose() function, if this case (view′ = w) occurs, the valid Writeproof does
not contain the NEW-VIEW-ACK message from the leader of view w (line 13 of Fig. 7). In this
case, the size of the set Z is at least SZ = S2v ≥ Na−Q−F −M +1, as we are sure that the NEW-
VIEW-ACK message from at least one malicious acceptor (the leader of view w) is not included
in the WriteProof . As there are no two non-intersecting subsets of size Na − Q − F −M + 1 in
the set of size Na − F (if Na − F ≥ 2(Na −Q−M − F + 1) then Na ≤ 2M + F + 2Q− 2, which
would contradict our assumptions on the number of acceptors), v2 := v at line 14, Fig. 7).
If there is no candidate-3 value v′, or if there is such a value with the associated view number
view′ < w, or if v′ = v, then choose() returns v, w (lines 19-20, Fig. 7). Again, it is not possible
that view′ > w, so we discuss the case where view′ = w and v′neqv. There are three exhaustive
possibilities: (a) PREPARE messages exchanged among acceptors are authenticated, (b) PREPARE
messages exchanged among acceptors are not authenticated and the cardinality of the candidate-3
value is S3v′ ≥M+1 and (c) PREPARE messages exchanged among acceptors are not authenticated
and S3 ≤M .
In case (a), digital signatures from the sets P∗ that contain v′, certify that Na−F different acceptors
sent 〈PREPARE, v′, w〉 message. Due to Lemma 4, v′ = v, a contradiction.
In case (b), existence of at least M + 1 P∗ sets that contain v′, i.e., including at least one that is
sent by a non-malicious acceptor, certifies that Na−F different acceptors sent 〈PREPARE, v′, w〉
message. Similarily as in the case (a), we reach a contradiction.
Consider case (c). If configuration is C1, then the Writeproof is not valid (line 23, Fig. 7. Consider
now configuration C2. As in this case, P∗ sets are accompanied with “lazy” proofs, every valid Pai
set is certified with at least Na−2F ≥M +1 signatures, including at least one signature from non-
malicious acceptor. In other words, there are two distinct non-malicious acceptors that accepted
different values in w, i.e., the leader of view w is malicious. From the choose() function, if this case
occurs, the valid Writeproof does not contain the NEW-VIEW-ACK message from the leader of
view w (lines 25, Fig. 7). In this case, the size of the set Z is at least SZ = S2v ≥ Na−Q−F−M+1,
as we are sure that the NEW-VIEW-ACK message from at least one malicious acceptor (the leader
of view w) is not included in the WriteProof . Again, there are three exhaustive subcases: (1)
S3v′ < Na −M − 2F + 1, (2) Na −M − 2F + 1 ≤ S3v′ < M and (3) S3v′ = M . In case (1), choose()
returns v (line 28, Fig. 7). In case (2),Writeproof is not valid (line 29, Fig. 7). In case (3), as there
are at most M − 1 messages in the Writeproof are from the malicious acceptors (as the message
from the malicious leader of view w is not in the Writeproof), one non-malicious acceptor ai sent
Pai that contains v
′. Similarily as in the case (a), we conclude that, due to Lemma 4, v = v′ - a
contradiction.
Inductive Hypothesis (IH): Assume that no non-malicious acceptor ai can pre-prepare any value
different from v in any view from w + 1 to w + k. We prove that no non-malicious acceptor ai can
pre-prepare any value different from v in the view w + k + 1.
Inductive Step: Again, it is sufficient to prove that any choose() function on any valid Writeproof
of view w + k + 1 returns v. From Lemma 2(e), there is a set Z of size at least Na −Q−M − F ,
that contains only non-malicious acceptors, such that every acceptor in Z pre-prepared v in w
and its NEW-VIEW-ACK message is part of the WriteProof of view w + k + 1. In fact, as the
set Z contains only non-malicious acceptors, applying IH yields that ∀ai ∈ Z ∃wi ≥ w, (Kai =
(v, wi)) ∈WriteProof . Therefore, v is the candidate-2 value and the M +1st highest view number
associated with v in Z is wv ≥ w. Therefore, choose(*, Writeproof) in view w + k + 1 can only
return (∗, w′ ≥ w). The sets K∗ and P∗ in the valid WriteProof of view w + k + 1 contain only
values with associated view numbers up to w+ k (line 4, Fig. 8). Let choose(*, Writeproof) return
(v′, w′ ≤ w + k). If w′ > w, then v′ = v because, by IH a value pre-prepared by any non-malicious
acceptor in view w′, such that w < w′ ≤ w + k can be only v, and by Lemma 8, in order for
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choose(*,WriteProof) to return (v′, w′), one non-malicious acceptor must have pre-prepared v′ in
w′. Now we consider the case where w′ = w = wv and v′ 6= v (it is not difficult to see that v = v′
results in choose() returning v).
If v′ is another candidate-2 value, then we conclude that there exists one non-malicious acceptor
aj that accepted v′ 6= v in some view higher or equal to w (as w′ is theM+1st highest view number
associated to v′). From IH, we know that this view can not be higher than w, so we conclude that
aj accepted v′ in view w. As we know that every acceptor from the set Z accepted v in w and as
Z contains only non-malicious acceptors, we conclude that the leader of view w was malicious. In
this case, from the modified choose() function, the valid Writeproof does not contain the NEW-
VIEW-ACK message from the leader of view w (lines 13 of Fig. 7). In this case, the size of the set
Z is at least SZ = S2v ≥ Na −Q−M − F + 1, as we are sure that the NEW-VIEW-ACK message
from at least one malicious process (the leader of view w) is outside the WriteProof . As there are
no two non-intersecting subsets of size Na−Q−M −F +1 in the set of Na−F acceptors, v2 := v
at line 14, Fig. 7).
Assume v′ 6= v, with w′ = w is a candidate-3 value. Here we use the same reasoning as in the
Base step, which is repeated here for completeness. Again, there are three exhaustive possibilities:
(a) PREPARE messages exchanged among acceptors are authenticated, (b) PREPARE messages
exchanged among acceptors are not authenticated and the cardinality of the candidate-3 value is
S3v′ ≥ M + 1 and (c) PREPARE messages exchanged among acceptors are not authenticated and
S3 ≤M .
In case (a), digital signatures from the sets P∗ that contain v′, certify that Na−F different acceptors
sent 〈PREPARE, v′, w〉 message. Due to Lemma 4, v′ = v, a contradiction.
In case (b), existence of at least M + 1 P∗ sets that contain v′, i.e., including at least one that is
sent by a non-malicious acceptor, certifies that Na−F different acceptors sent 〈PREPARE, v′, w〉
message. Similarly as in the case (a), we reach a contradiction.
Consider case (c). If configuration is C1, then the Writeproof is not valid (line 23, Fig. 7. Consider
now configuration C2. As in this case, P∗ sets are accompanied with “lazy” proofs, every valid Pai
set is certified with at least Na−2F ≥M +1 signatures, including at least one signature from non-
malicious acceptor. In other words, there are two distinct non-malicious acceptors that accepted
different values in w, i.e., the leader of view w is malicious. From the choose() function, if this case
occurs, the valid Writeproof does not contain the NEW-VIEW-ACK message from the leader of
view w (lines 25, Fig. 7). In this case, the size of the set Z is at least SZ = S2v ≥ Na−Q−F−M+1,
as we are sure that the NEW-VIEW-ACK message from at least one malicious acceptor (the leader
of view w) is not included in the WriteProof . Again, there are three exhaustive subcases: (1)
S3v′ < Na −M − 2F + 1, (2) Na −M − 2F + 1 ≤ S3v′ < M and (3) S3v′ = M . In case (1), choose()
returns v (line 28, Fig. 7). In case (2),Writeproof is not valid (line 29, Fig. 7). In case (3), as there
are at most M − 1 messages in the Writeproof are from the malicious acceptors (as the message
from the malicious leader of view w is not in the Writeproof), one non-malicious acceptor ai sent
Pai that contains v
′. Similarly as in the case (a), we conclude that, due to Lemma 4, v = v′ - a
contradiction.
Lemma 12. If w is the lowest view number in which some value v is Learned-3, then no non-
malicious acceptor ai pre-prepares any value v′, v′ 6= v in any view higher than w.
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction on view numbers.
Base Step: First, we prove that no non-malicious acceptor ai can pre-prepare any value different
from v in view w + 1. A non-malicious acceptor ai in w + 1 pre-prepares a value v′ only if the
emphchoose() function on the valid WriteProof of view w+1 returns v′. Therefore, it is sufficient
to prove that for any valid Writeproof , choose(*,Writeproof) returns v.
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Assume, without loss of generality, that v was Learned-3 by learner l in view w. Then (Def. 2, 3),
a set X of at least Na − F acceptors pre-prepared v in w. As the valid WriteProof of view
w + 1 consists of NEW-VIEW-ACK messages from a set Y of Na − F acceptors, there is a non-
empty subset Z of the set X ∩ Y that contains only non-malicious acceptors with cardinality
SZ = S3v ≥ Na − 2F −M . By Lemma 10, every acceptor ai ∈ Z pre-prepared and prepared v in
w, before replying with the message NEW-VIEW-ACK to the leader of view w + 1. Therefore,
∀ai ∈ Z, (Pai = (v, w)) ∈WriteProof , i.e. v is the candidate-3 value. In a valid Writeproof there
are no two candidate-3 values with the same view number (line 5, Fig. 7). As w is the highest view
number that can appear in the WriteProof of w+1, it follows that the v3 := v, view3 = w at line
4, Figure 7.
Similarly there cannot be a candidate-2 value v′ 6= v, with M + 1st highest associated view
number w′ > w in the valid Writeproof of view w+1. Let v2 be the candidate-2 value selected by
the lines 7-17 of Figure 7, with associated view number view2 (line 18, Fig. 7). If there is no such
a value, or if view2 < w, or if (v2 6= v and S3v > M), or if PREPARE messages exchanged among
acceptors are authenticated, or if, finally, v2 = v, then choose(*,Writeproof) returns (v, w) (lines
19-21, Fig. 7). Now we consider the only possible case left, the case where: (a) PREPARE messages
exchanged among acceptors are not authenticated, (b) view2 = w, (c) v2 6= v and (d) SZ = S3v ≤M .
If system configuration is C1, then the Writeproof is not valid. Consider now configuration C2.
As in this case, P∗ sets are accompanied with “lazy” proofs, every valid Pai set is certified with at
least Na − 2F ≥ M + 1 signatures, including at least one signature from non-malicious acceptor.
Furthermore, as v2 is a candidate-2 value with associated view number view2 = w, there are at
least M + 1 (Lemma 2(g)) acceptors, out of which at least one is non-malicious, that accepted
v2 6= v in w. In other words, there are two distinct non-malicious acceptors that accepted different
values in w, i.e., the leader of view w is malicious. From the choose() function, if this case occurs,
the valid Writeproof does not contain the NEW-VIEW-ACK message from the leader of view w
(line 25, Fig. 7). In this case, the size of the set Z is at least SZ = S3v ≥ Na −Q− F −M + 1, as
we are sure that the NEW-VIEW-ACK message from at least one malicious acceptor (the leader
of view w) is not included in the WriteProof . From the lines 27-29, Figure 7 it is not difficult to
see that, in this case, either choose(*,Writeproof) returns (v, w) (line 27), or the Writeproof is not
valid (line 29).
Inductive Hypothesis (IH): Assume that no non-malicious acceptor ai pre-prepares any value dif-
ferent from v in any view from w + 1 to w + k. We prove that no non-malicious acceptor ai can
pre-prepare any value different from v in view w + k + 1.
Inductive Step: Again, it is sufficient to prove that any validWriteproof of view w+k+1 witnesses
v. As in the Base step, we can argue that there is a set Z containing at least SZ = S3v ≥ Na− 2F −
M non-malicious acceptors that pre-prepared and prepared v in w and whose NEW-VIEW-ACK
message is part of the WriteProof of view w+k+1. The sets K∗ and P∗ in the valid WriteProof
of view w + k + 1 contain only values with associated view numbers up to w + k (line 4, Fig. 8).
Assume choose(∗,Writeproof) returns (v′, w′ ≤ w + k. If w′ > w then v′ = v because, by IH a
value pre-prepared by any non-malicious acceptor in view w′, w < w′ ≤ w + k can be only v, and
by Lemma 8, in order for choose(∗,WriteProof) to return v′, w′, one non-malicious acceptor must
have pre-prepared v′ in a view higher or equal to w′. On the other hand, it is not possible that
w′ < w, as the presence of the messages sent by the acceptors from the set Z in the Writeproof
guarantees that v will be the candidate-3 value with an associated view number higher than or
equal to w. Therefore, choose(∗,WriteProof) will always return a value with the associated view
number w′ ≥ w. Finally, if w′ = w, we can use similar reasoning as in the Base Step and conclude
that there can not be more than one candidate-3 values with the associated view number w in the
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valid WriteProof , nor some candidate-2 value v′ 6= v with associated view number w′ = w can be
selected before candidate-3 value v. Hence, we conclude that the choose(∗,WriteProof) returns v.
Lemma 13. If w is the lowest view number in which some value v is learned, then no non-malicious
acceptor ai pre-prepares any value v′ 6= v in any view higher than w.
Proof. Follows directly from Lemmas 7, 11 and 12.
Lemma 14. (Agreement) No two different values can be learned.
Proof. Follows from Lemma 13 and the fact that if some value v′ is learned in view w some non-
malicious acceptor pre-prepared v′ in w.
Lemma 14 proves Agreement.
To help prove liveness (i.e., the Termination property) and the show that DGV allows very
fast (resp. fast) learning, we identify three Weak Termination properties of the Locking part of our
algorithm.
– Very Fast Weak Termination (VFWT) If (a) run r is synchronous, (b) a correct privileged
proposer pk is the only proposer that proposes a value (for a sufficiently long time) in r and (c)
at most Q acceptors are faulty, then every correct learner learns a value in two communication
rounds.
– Fast Weak Termination (FWT) If (a) run r is synchronous, (b) a correct privileged proposer
pk is the only proposer that proposes a value (for a sufficiently long time) in r and (c) Q′,
where Q < Q′ ≤ F acceptors are faulty, then every correct learner learns a value in three
communication rounds.
– Eventual Weak Termination (EWT) If (a) run r is eventually synchronous, (b) a correct proposer
pk proposes a value at time t, after GST (t > GST ), with the highest view number out of all
proposals invoked up to time t, (c) no proposer proposes a value after t with a higher view
number (for a sufficiently long time) and (d) at most F acceptors are faulty, then every correct
learner eventually learns a value.
The notion of ”sufficiently long time” in the case of VFWT, means that no proposer other than
pk proposes before Na − Q correct acceptors receive the PRE-PREPARE message from pInit. In
the synchronous run in which up to Q acceptors are faulty, this time (∆c) is bounded and correctly
estimated by every acceptor. In the case of FWT, ”sufficiently long time” means that no proposer
other than pk proposes before Na − F correct acceptors receive the Na − F PREPARE messages
that correspond to PRE-PREPARE message sent by pInit. In the synchronous run in which up
to F acceptors are faulty, this time (∆c) is bounded and correctly estimated by every acceptor.
Finally, in the case of EWT, ”sufficiently long time” means that either no proposer proposes the
value before Na−Q correct acceptors receive the PRE-PREPARE message from the pk, or Na−F
correct acceptors receive each Na − F PREPARE messages corresponding to pk’s proposal.
Lemma 15. The Locking module, from Figure8, satisfies Very Fast Weak Termination.
Proof. As the run is synchronous, correct acceptors receive the PRE-PREPARE message from the
correct privileged proposer within a known time period (i.e., ∆c). As no other proposer proposes
for a sufficiently long time, i.e. until Na − Q correct acceptors receive PRE-PREPARE message,
Na−Q correct acceptors pre-prepare leader’s proposal and send a PREPARE message to learners.
Again, as the run is synchronous, every correct learner receives Na−Q PREPARE messages within
2∆c after the value was proposed, when it learns a value,. Therefore, every correct learner learns a
value in two communication rounds after the correct proposer proposed a value.
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Lemma 16. The Locking module, from Figure 8, satisfies Fast Weak Termination.
Proof. The proof is analogous to that of Lemma 15.
Using the VFWT property of the Locking part, we can prove that DGV provides very fast learning.
Lemma 17. If the run is synchronous and up to Q acceptors fail and the privileged proposer pInit
(p0) is correct and proposes a value (very favorable run), then DGV algorithm provides very fast
learning.
Proof. To prove this lemma, we assume that pInit proposes immediately after the initialization
of the algorithm. From line 2, Figure 8, we see that when the correct pInit proposes, it skips the
READ phase and directly sending the PRE-PREPARE message to the acceptors. As the run is
synchronous, all messages sent among correct processes are delivered within a correctly estimated
(by every correct process) bound on the message transmission delay (∆c). This guarantees that no
correct acceptor receives PRE-PREPARE message after ∆c and that the timers at acceptors are
set according to ∆c (i.e., no acceptor times out at t = ∆c). In other words, as the pInit proposes
immediately after initialization of the algorithm, no correct acceptor will suspect the leader at ∆c
and all correct acceptors will receive a PRE-PREPARE message before any other proposer proposes
(with a valid view proof), i.e., no other proposer proposes for a sufficiently long time. From the
V FWT property of the Locking module we conclude that all the correct learners learn a value
within two communication rounds.
Lemma 18. If the run is synchronous and up to F acceptors fail and the privileged proposer pInit
(p0) is correct and proposes a value (very favorable run), then DGV algorithm provides fast learning.
Proof. The proof is analogous to that of Lemma 17.
We proceed with few more lemmas to prove Termination.
Lemma 19. If a valid Writeproof consists only of NEW-VIEW-ACK messages sent by non-
malicious acceptors, choose(∗,Writeproof) never aborts.
Proof. It is sufficient to prove that if choose(∗,Writeproof) aborts, then the Writeproof contains
a NEW-VIEW-ACK message from at least one malicious acceptor. First, consider the case where
choose(∗,Writeproof) aborts with flag = true (in lines 13 and 25, Figure 7). We consider the
following two exhaustive subcases:
Case (a): choose() aborts in line 13, as there are two candidate-2 values v′ and v′′ 6= v′ with the
sameM +1st highest associated view number w and the leader of the view w is in the Writeproof .
Therefore, inWriteproof there are (at most) three acceptors: aw, the leader of the view w, ai, that
claims it received v′ from aw in view w, and aj , that claims that it received v′′ from aw in view w.
It is not difficult to see that at least one of these acceptors is malicious.
Case (b): choose() aborts in line 25, as there is a candidate-2 values v2 with the M + 1st highest
associated view number w, and a candidate-2 value v3 with the same associated view number w
and the leader of the view w is in the Writeproof . Similarly as in the case (a), in Writeproof
there are (at most) three acceptors: aw, the leader of the view w, ai, that claims it received v2 from
aw in view w, and aj , that claims it received v3 from aw in view w. It is not difficult to see that at
least one of these acceptors is malicious.
Consider now the case where choose(∗,Writeproof) function with flag = false (lines 5,23 and
29 of Fig. 7. We consider the following three exhaustive subcases:
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Case (a): flag = false because there is more than one candidate-3 value (line 5). In this case, there
are two acceptors ai and aj that claim that a set A of Na − F acceptors accepted a value v and
a set B of Na − F acceptors accepted a value v′ 6= v in the same view w. As Na > 2F +M , the
sets A and B intersect in at least one non-malicious acceptor, so either acceptor ai or acceptor aj
is malicious.
Case (b): flag = false because there is a candidate-2 value v2 and a candidate-3 value v3, with the
same associated view number, such that v2 6= v3 and S3v3 ≤M in configuration C1, where PREPARE
messages exchanged among acceptors are not authenticated (line 23). In this case, the bound on the
number of acceptors is Na ≥ 2F+M+Q+1, whereM > Q (otherwise S3v3 ≥ Na−2F−M ≥M+1).
In the WriteProof , there is a set A of at least Na−Q−M −F ≥ F +1 acceptors that claim they
accepted v2. Also, there is a set B of at least Na−M − 2F ≥ Q+1 acceptors that claim that they
received (independently of each other) v3 from Na − F acceptors. Therefore, every acceptor from
the set B claims that some acceptor from A sent v3 to it. Obviously, there is at least one malicious
acceptor in the set A ∪B.
Case (c): flag = false because there is a candidate-2 value v2, with cardinality S2v2 ≥ Na−Q−M−
F +1 and a candidate-3 value v3, with cardinality S3v3 ≥ Na−M − 2F +1 and M > S3v3 , where v2
and v3 6= v2 have the same associated view number w, in configuration C2, in the case PREPARE
messages exchanged among acceptors are not authenticated and the NEW-VIEW-ACK message
from the (malicious) leader of view w is not in the WriteProof (line 29). In this case, the bound
on the number of acceptors is Na ≥ 2F +M + Q, where M − 1 > Q (otherwise, if M − 1 ≤ Q,
Na ≥ 2F + 2M − 1 and S3v3 ≥ Na −M − 2F + 1 yields S3v3 ≥M). In Writeproof , there is a set A
of at least Na −Q−M −F +1 ≥ F +1 acceptors that claim they accepted v2. Also, there is a set
B of at least Na −M − 2F + 1 ≥ Q+ 1 acceptors that claim that they received (independently of
each other) v3 from Na − F acceptors. Therefore, every acceptor from the set B claims that some
acceptor from A sent v3 to it. Obviously, there is at least one malicious acceptor in the set A ∪B.
For the EWT property of the Locking module to hold, malicious acceptors need to be prevented
from sending false, but valid NEW-VIEW-NACK messages. To satisfy this, it is sufficient to guar-
antee that no acceptor can have a valid view proof of the view number that has not been proposed.7
We call this property the No-Creation property of the view proofs.
Lemma 20. The Locking module, from Figure 8, satisfies Eventual Weak Termination, given that
the view proofs satisfy the No-Creation property.
Proof. As (a) the run is eventually synchronous, (b) a correct proposer pk proposes at time t after
GST , with a highest view number among all proposals up to t, (c) no proposer other than pk
proposes the value for a sufficiently long time, we conclude that Na − F correct acceptors receive
the NEW-VIEW message from pk, complete the LPO subprotocol (if necessary) and reply with the
NEW-VIEW-ACK message to pk which eventually receives all messages from correct acceptors.
By Lemma 19, the choose(vpk ,Writeproof) does not abort and returns v. Furthermore, as the
No-Creation property of the view proofs holds, no malicious acceptor can reply with a valid NEW-
VIEW-NACK message to pk. Therefore, pk sends the PRE-PREPARE message containing the
proposal value v. As no other process proposes until (a) Na − Q correct acceptors receive PRE-
PREPARE message from pk or (b) Na − F correct acceptors receive each Na − F PREPARE
messages, we conclude that (a) at least Na − Q PREPARE messages or (b) at least Na − F
7 Under the notion of proposing, we consider only propose() invocations with the valid view proofs.
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COMMIT messages are sent to every correct learner. Note that Na−Q correct acceptors from the
case (a) might not exist, as only Na−F ≤ Na−Q correct acceptors are guaranteed to exist. If there
are more than Q acceptor failures, Na − F COMMIT messages will be sent as there are at least
Na − F correct acceptors which pre-prepare pk’s proposal and no proposer other than pk proposes
a value for a sufficiently long time. As the run is eventually synchronous and PREPARE messages
in case (a) and COMMIT messages in case (b) are sent after GST, eventually every correct learner
lj receives Na−Q PREPARE messages or Na−F COMMIT messages, and thus, lj learns a value
if it did not learn some value before. Therefore, eventually every correct learner learns a value.
Lemma 21. View proofs generated in the Election module of the DGV algorithm satisfy the No-
Creation property.
Proof. To prove this lemma, we show that the way the view proofs are generated (lines 13,24-26,
Fig. 9) together with Lemma 2(f), guarantee that no process other than the leader of the view
w can generate a valid V iewProofw before the leader of w received all signed VIEW-CHANGE
messages from correct acceptors contained in V iewProofw. Note that a valid V iewProofw contains
VIEW-CHANGE messages from b(Na +M)/2 + 1c acceptors, i.e. from at least a majority of non-
malicious acceptors (Lemma 2(f)) and non-malicious acceptors send the VIEW-CHANGE message
for a view w only to the leader of the view w. By lines 26-27 of Figure 9 and lines 3-4 of Fig 10,
a correct proposer pk, leader of view w, will immediately propose the value upon reception of
necessary VIEW-CHANGE messages, so no acceptor can receive the view proof for the view w,
V iewProofw, before pk proposes the value. On the other hand, a malicious proposer might not
follow the algorithm. Note that, however, it is safe to make the assumption that the malicious
leader of the view w, pB, proposed the value as soon as some other (malicious) process generated
the valid V iewProofw. This is reasonable, as we can not distinguish the case in which pB does not
invoke propose() from the case in which pB invokes propose() with a valid view proof, but pB does
not send any protocol message. As pB must receive the signed VIEW-CHANGE messages sent by
non-malicious acceptors before any other process receives them, we can safely argue that, if pB
had followed the algorithm, it could have had proposed. Therefore, we say that pB proposed but
did not send any protocol message. Therefore view proofs that we use in our algorithm satisfy the
No-Creation property.
Now we prove the Termination property. This requires the correct learners to learn a value, if
a correct proposer proposes and at most F acceptors are faulty, under the assumption of the even-
tually synchronous system. Note also that immediately after the initialization of the algorithm,
correct acceptors trigger the SuspectT imeout timer. After triggering the SuspectT imeout, no cor-
rect acceptor will stop its timer permanently until it receives a DECISION message from at least
one learner.
Lemma 22. (Termination) If a correct proposer proposes a value, then eventually, every correct
learner learns a value.
Proof. Suppose there is a single, correct proposer pk that proposes at time t, after GST, with with
a highest view number w among all proposals invoked up to t. Let δ′ be the upper bound on the
time interval required for the execution of the following sequence of operations (after GST): the
last acceptor sends the VIEW-CHANGE message necessary for V iewProofw, pk checks the signa-
tures and generates the V iewProofw, pk sends NEW-VIEW message to acceptors, pk completes
successfully the READ phase (including the possible LPO), pk generates the WriteProof and
chooses proposal value, pk sends PRE-PREPARE messages, acceptors receive the proposal, check
the Writeproof and proposal value, send PREPARE messages to all learners and acceptors and,
finally, all correct acceptors prepare the pk’s proposal. As we assume that there is an upper bound
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on the time required for every local computation related to authentication, ∆auth, and that there
is an upper bound ∆c on the message transmission delay after GST, such finite upper bound δ′
exists (actually, it is sufficient that δ′ > 7(∆c +∆auth), as there are at most seven communication
rounds in the above described sequence of rounds, some of which involve local computations related
to authentication).
Suppose, by contradiction, that some correct learner never learns a value even if some correct
proposer proposes. We distinguish two cases: (a) when no correct acceptor receives a DECISION
message from any learner and (b) when some correct acceptor receives a DECISION message from
some learner.
We first consider case (a). First, we claim that, in this case, every correct acceptor goes through
an infinite number of views. Basically, we show that there will be an infinite number of new views
after GST, as the system is eventually synchronous.
Suppose that there is a finite number of views and let w be the highest view number among
them. Due to our assumption that no correct acceptor receives a DECISION message, no correct
acceptor stops its SuspectT imeout permanently. Therefore, SuspectT imeout keeps expiring and
being reset at every acceptor and, consequently, every correct acceptor issues VIEW-CHANGE
messages for an infinite number of views. As we assume that there are at least Na − F correct
acceptors, Na−F ≥ b(Na+M)/2+1c (Lemma 1) and as the messages among correct processes are
delivered in a timely manner after GST, there will be a view number w′ higher than w for which
some correct proposer sends a NEW-VIEW message. Therefore, every correct acceptor will accept
the NEW-VIEW message for the view w′ unless it is already in the higher view than w′. In any
case, every correct acceptor will be in the higher view than w - a contradiction. Therefore, every
correct acceptor goes through an infinite number of views and the SuspectT imeout grows infinitely
at every correct acceptor.
Note that when an acceptor sends a VIEW-CHANGE message for a view w, it triggers a
timeout of duration InitT imeout ∗ 2w, where InitT imeout is the initial value of SuspectT imeout.
The value of InitT imeout is the same at every acceptor. Let tdelivery be the time at which all the
VIEW-CHANGE messages sent before GST that are not lost are delivered. The time tdelivery exists
as there is a finite number of VIEW-CHANGE messages sent before GST and as the messages that
are not lost are eventually delivered. Let t > max(GST, tdelivery) be the time where ∀ai ∈ C,wai >
dlog2(δ′/InitT imeout)e, where C is a set of correct acceptors. Let wmin = min{wai |ai ∈ C} and
NextV iewmax = max{NextV iewai |ai ∈ C} at time t. In other words, t is the time at which all
correct acceptors are in the view higher or equal to wmin, where InitT imeout ∗ 2wmin > δ′.
Let w be the lowest view number higher than NextV iewmax+1 in which some correct proposer
pk is the leader. As there is an infinite number of view changes, all correct acceptors will send a
VIEW CHANGE message for view w, at latest at tw = t+ InitT imeout ∗ (2wmin+1 + . . .+ 2w−1).
Furthermore, no correct acceptor will send any VIEW-CHANGE message for any view higher
than w before tw+1 = t + InitT imeout ∗ 2w. Note that for the time tw+1 − tw there will be no
proposer that proposes with a higher view number than the pk. Pk will propose at the latest right
after tw, when it receives b(Na +M)/2 + 1c VIEW-CHANGE messages. Note that tw+1 − tw =
InitT imeout ∗ (2wmin + . . .+21+20+1) > InitT imeout ∗ 2wmin > δ′ Basically, pk will be the only
proposer that proposes a value for a period of time greater than δ′, with a highest view number of
all proposals up to tw. In other words, pk will propose at tw > GST , with a highest view number
up to tw, for a sufficiently long time. By the Eventual Weak Termination property of the Locking
module, every correct learner eventually decides - a contradiction.
Consider now the case (b) where some correct acceptor receives a DECISION message from
some learner. As a correct learner periodically sends a query to acceptors if it does not learn a value
and as, after GST, all messages sent among correct processes are delivered, a correct acceptor will
eventually forward a DECISION message to a correct learner that will thus learn a value.
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As ai is correct and as after GST messages among correct processes are delivered within a
bounded of time, new leader can wait for additional NEW-VIEW-(N)ACK message if choose()
function detects a malicious acceptor within the WriteProof . After the reception of an additional
message the new leader invokes choose() function on every subset of size Na − F of the set of
received NEW-VIEW-ACK messages (e.g., in a set of Na − F + 1 NEW-VIEW-ACK messages,
there are Na−F +1 subsets of size Na−F ). If every choose() invocation aborts with flag = false
on every subset of received NEW-VIEW-ACK messages of size Na−F , the leader waits for another
NEW-VIEW-ACK message and so on.
5.7 DGV variants
First, we give the DGV variants that match the lower bounds for configuration C2. This is followed
by discussing DGV optimization in a special case of parameter values, namely Q = F .
Configuration C2 As we pointed out earlier the DGV variation DGVAlg.1 addressed a special
case of configuration C2, where all proposers are also acceptors and where authentication is not
used for very fast learning. This variant is optimized for using in the state-machine replication in
a model where there can be more than one privileged proposer that is also an acceptor, but, for a
single consensus instance, there is only one privileged proposer/acceptor. However, to give a generic
lower bound matching solution for configuration C2 (part 2 of the theorem), we need to modify
DGVAlg.1. First, we give the general solution for configuration C2 in the case authentication is not
used for very fast learning. Namely we show that:
Proposition Alg.3 There is a consensus algorithm A, with a single proposer pl, where pl is also an
acceptor, such that: in every very favorable run of A every correct learner learns a value by round
2 without using authentication despite the failure of Q acceptors whenever Na > max(2(M − 1) +
Q+ 2F, 2M +Q+ F ). This matches the bound established by combining propositions L.4 and L.5
from Section 4.
In addition, in every favorable run of A, every correct learner learns a value by round 3 despite
the failure of F acceptors:
(a) using authentication when Na ≤ 2F + (M − 1) +min(M − 1, Q),
(b) without using authentication when Na > 2F + (M − 1) +min(M − 1, Q). This matches the
bound established by proposition L.6) from Section 4.
Interestingly, to prove proposition Alg.3, we simplify the DGVAlg.1 in a way that we use very
fast learning techniques only in Initview. Namely,
1. Acceptors do not send PREPARE messages to learners in any view other than Initview.
2. Acceptors do not modify their Kai sets in a view other than InitV iew.
The rest of the algorithm stays the same (performance optimizations are possible). Practically,
these small changes significantly simplify the DGV variation DGVAlg.1 and, especially, its proof.
Basically, solving potential disputes among candidate values becomes a lot easier whenever there
is a candidate (namely candidate-3) value with associated view number higher than Initview).
Now we match the lower bound from part 2 of the theorem in the case authentication is used
in very fast learning. Namely we show that:
Proposition Alg.4 There is a consensus algorithm A, with a single proposer pl, where pl is also an
acceptor, such that: in every very favorable run of A every correct learner learns a value by round
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2 (using authentication) despite the failure of Q acceptors whenever Na > 2(M −1)+Q+2F . This
matches the bound established by proposition L.4 from Section 4.
To prove proposition Alg.4, we need to introduce two additional changes to DGVAlg.1. Namely,
in addition to changes (1) and (2), i.e., not using very fast learning techniques in any view other
than Initview, we introduce the following modifications:
– Privileged proposer pInit authenticates (signs) its PRE-PREPARE message in Initview.
– We simplify and somewhat modify the choose() function.
Note that for simplicity, we give a variant of DGV that satisfies proposition Alg.4, but does not
consider fast learning. The DGV Alg.4 variant that allows fast learning, both with and without using
authenticated (very) fast learning messages (with respect to the number of available acceptors) can
be obtained by merging the original Alg.1 choose() function we gave in Section 5.4 in Figure 7 with
the variant of choose() function we give below.
The choose() function for Alg.4 variant of DGV is given in Figure 11. Note that this special
variant of DGV assumes Na > max(2F +M, 2(M − 1) + F + 2Q). This special case is interesting
only in the cases where Q = 0, 1, as for Q ≥ 2, 2(M − 1) + F + 2Q > 2M + F +Q and, according
to part 2 of the lower bound theorem, DGV variant that does not use authentication for very fast
learning (i.e., Alg.3) is feasible.
1: choose(v,WriteProof) returns(v, view) is {
2: view2, view3 := −1; v2, v3 := nil
3: sort all (if any) candidate-3 values by their associated view no.; let w3 be the highest among those view no.
4: if ∃ a candidate-3 value v′3 associated with w3 then v3 := v′3; view3 := w3 endif
5: if there is a single candidate-2 value v′ then v2 := v’;
6: elseif there are two candidate-2 values v′ and v′′ then
7: if NEW-VIEW-ACK sent by the privileged proposer pInit is in Writeproof then abort
8: elseif S2v′ ≥ Na −Q− F −M + 1 then v2 := v′ elseif S2v′′ ≥ Na −Q− F −M + 1 then v2 := v′′
9: endif
10: endif
11: if v2 6= nil then view2 := Initview endif
12: if view2 > view3 then return(v2, view2) elseif view3 > view2 return(v3, view3) else return(v,⊥) endif
Fig. 11. DGV-Alg.4: Configuration C2, matching the lower bound when authentication is used for very fast learning
- choose() function
We sketch the correctness proof for the Alg.4 variant of DGV. If the value was learned in
Initview it will be reported byNa−Q−M−F acceptors in anyWriteProof . First, as the inequality
Na −Q−M − F ≥M + 1 does not hold in this case, we need to show that Na −Q−M − F > 0.
From Na > max(2F +M, 2(M −1)+F +2Q), we have Na−Q−M −F > max(F −Q,M +Q−2).
As F ≥ Q, we conclude Na −Q−M − F > 0. Therefore, if a value was learned in Initview it will
certainly be a candidate-2 value in every Writeproof as at least Na − Q −M − F acceptors will
report it and non-malicious acceptors do not change their Kai set in any view w > Initview. If the
value v is learned in w > Initview we can use the similar reasoning as in Lemma 12, Section 5.6
to conclude that every choose(∗,Writeproof) in any view w′ > w must return v. It is also not
difficult to see that if the value is learned in view w > Initview it was accepted by at least one
non-malicious acceptor in w. However, this is not true for Initview.
40
Therefore, we show that if v was learned in Initview non-malicious acceptors accept only v in
every w > Initview. The proof uses induction on view numbers, but we prove here only the Base
Step. If v is the only candidate-2 value in Writeproof of Initview+1 than choose(∗,Writeproof)
returns v. If there is another candidate-2 value, obviously privileged proposer pInit is malicious
and the valid Writeproof does not contain a message sent by pInit. Therefore, in this case, in
valid Writeproof S2v ≥ Na −Q−M − F + 1 and as there cannot be two candidate-2 values with
cardinalities of at least Na −Q−M − F + 1 (as this would contradict Na > 2(M − 1) + F + 2Q),
choose(∗,Writeproof) returns v. Therefore, Agreement cannot be violated.
One may argue that Validity can be violated as a set of malicious acceptors can make up a
(single) candidate-2 value from a ”thin“ air. However, this is not the case. To see this, consider the
case where pInit is not malicious. In this case, as pInit authenticates the PRE-PREPARE message,
malicious acceptors cannot forge this signature and, therefore, cannot make up a candidate-2 value.
On the other hand if pInit is malicious, any value that malicious acceptors can make up, pInit could
have had proposed, without non-malicious acceptors distinguishing these cases.
Q=F WhenQ = F , the fast learning does not provide any additional guarantees with respect to the
very fast learning. Therefore, in every WRITE phase of any DGV variation PREPARE messages
exchanged among acceptors in Initview are not necessary. In the case of DGV variants Alg.1 and
Alg.2, this extends to WRITE phase in every view. The algorithm becomes much simpler as the
WRITE phase of the Locking module consists always of only 2 communication rounds, regardless
of the other algorithm parameters, namely M and F .
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Appendix: Removing authentication from DECISION messages
In Section 5.3, we argued that the signing of the DECISION message that learners send upon
learning a value can be avoided. A DECISION message permanently stops the SuspectT imeout,
and, thus, the Election at an acceptor module. The idea is to use the generalized consistent broad-
cast (GCB) subroutine [1, 4]. GCB has three primitives: (1) gcBcast(v), (2) gcDeliver(v) and (3)
gcWeakDeliver(v). GCB has the following properties:
– (Validity) If a correct learner gcBcasts v, then all correct acceptors gcDeliver v.
– (No Creation) If some learner gcWeakDelivers v, then v was gcBcasted by some learner.
– (Relay) If a correct acceptor gcDelivers v, then all correct acceptors eventually gcDeliver v.
– (Priority) If a correct acceptor gcDelivers v, then all correct learners eventually gcWeakDeliver
v.
Implementation of the general consistent broadcast is given in Figure 12. It is slightly modified
(generalized with respect to M and F and configuration where learners and acceptors are distinct)
from the implementation of [1]. Every message sent within the GCB subroutine is retransmitted
periodically, to circumvent our assumption on unreliable channels, i.e., to implement virtual reliable
channels.
at every learner lj :
1: to gcBcast(v):
2: send 〈INIT, v〉 to all acceptors
3: upon reception of 〈READY, v〉 from M + 1 different acceptors
4: if no value already gcWeakDelivered then gcWeakDeliver(v)
at every acceptor aj :
5: upon reception of 〈INIT, v〉 from some learner
6: if no 〈ECHO, ∗〉 message already sent then send 〈ECHO, v〉 to all acceptors
7: upon reception of 〈ECHO, v〉 from b(Na +M)/2 + 1c different acceptors
8: if no 〈ECHO, ∗〉 message already sent then send 〈ECHO, v〉 to all acceptors
9: if no 〈READY, ∗〉 message already sent then send 〈READY, v〉 to all acceptors and learners
10: upon reception of 〈READY, v〉 from M + 1 different acceptors
11: if no 〈ECHO, ∗〉 message already sent then send 〈ECHO, v〉 to all acceptors
12: if no 〈READY, ∗〉 message already sent then send 〈READY, v〉 to all acceptors and learners
13: upon reception of 〈READY, v〉 from Na − F different acceptors
14: if no value already gcDelivered then gcDeliver(v)
Fig. 12. Implementation of a Generalized Consistent Broadcast
Having the implementation of GCB, Election module is modified to have every learner lj gcBcast
a value v, once lj learns v and, furthermore to have lj learn v, once that lj gcWeakDelivered v,
unless lj already learned a value. Furthermore, acceptor aj permanently stops its SuspectT imeout
once it gcDelivers some value.
Proof of correctness of GCB is similar to the proof of consistent unique broadcast given in [1],
using Lemmas 1 and 2 from Section 5.6 to prove intersection of subsets of acceptors. We omit the
complete proof.
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